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QUESTION PRESENTED
The Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq., permits
interception of “radio communications” that are not
“scrambled or encrypted.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16)(A).
The Act itself does not define “radio communications,”
but for decades the accepted meaning of the term in the
telecommunications field—and in a closely related statute, the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq.—
has broadly encompassed all transmissions made using
radio waves. That definition undisputedly includes the
unencrypted Wi-Fi transmissions at issue in this case.
The question presented is:
Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that
“radio communications” under the Wiretap Act are restricted to “predominantly auditory broadcasts” and do
not include Wi-Fi communications even though Wi-Fi
communications are transmitted using radio waves.

(i)

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant-appellant in the court of appeals, who is
petitioner here, is Google Inc.
Plaintiffs-appellees in the court of appeals, who are
respondents here, are: Benjamin Joffe, Lilla Marigza,
Rick Benitti, Bertha Davis, Jason Taylor, Eric Myhre,
John E. Redstone, Matthew Berlage, Patrick Keyes,
Karl H. Schulz, James Fairbanks, Aaron Linsky, Dean
M. Bastilla, Vicki Van Valin, Jeffrey Colman, Russell
Carter, Stephanie Carter, and Jennifer Locsin.
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Google Inc. does not have a parent corporation, and
no publicly-held company owns ten percent or more of
Google Inc.’s stock.
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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
No. 13GOOGLE INC.,
Petitioner,
v.
JOFFE, et al.,
Respondents.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner Google Inc. (“Google”) respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (App. 1a-30a) is
not yet published but is available at 2013 WL 6905957.
That opinion amended a prior opinion (App. 31a-64a),
which is reported at 729 F.3d 1262. The opinion of the
district court (App. 65a-101a) is reported at 794 F.
Supp. 2d 1067.

2
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered
on September 10, 2013. The court granted in part a petition for rehearing and filed an amended opinion on
December 27, 2013. This Court has jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Relevant provisions of the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510 et seq., are reproduced in the Appendix.
INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT
This case concerns the application of the Wiretap
Act, a criminal statute governing the interception of
electronic and wire communications, to Wi-Fi and other
technologies that involve the transmission of information using radio waves. The Ninth Circuit held that
the statutory exemption for acquisition of unencrypted
“radio communications” was not applicable because WiFi transmissions are not “predominantly auditory
broadcasts.” But that interpretation has no basis in the
statutory text, is at odds with decades of understanding
of the meaning of “radio communication” in telecommunications law, and is irreconcilable with modern communications technology, which does not distinguish between the transmission of auditory and other data files.
Accordingly, if left uncorrected, the court of appeals’
decision will lead to confusion and uncertainty, particularly for the information technology industry and its
tens of millions of customers.
1. The Wiretap Act broadly prohibits the interception of wire and electronic communications, but allows interception of “an electronic communication made
through an electronic communication system that is
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configured so that such electronic communication is
readily accessible to the general public.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511(2)(g)(i). The Act expressly provides that “radio
communications” are “readily accessible to the general
public”—and thus exempt from the prohibition on interception—if they are not “scrambled or encrypted”
(or transmitted in another restricted manner specified
in the Act). Id. § 2510(16)(A). The question at issue in
this case is whether unencrypted Wi-Fi communications, which are undisputedly carried over radio waves,
are “radio communications” and thus not subject to the
Wiretap Act’s ban on interception.
2. The term “Wi-Fi” refers to “a wireless local area network that uses radio waves to connect computers
and other devices to the Internet.” Webster’s New College Dictionary 1636 (Michael Agnes ed., Wiley Publ’g,
Inc. 2007). Wi-Fi transmissions are broadcast wirelessly to users over radio waves by devices known as routers or access points. See Commonwealth Scientific &
Indus. Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech., Inc., 542 F.3d
1363, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (explaining that in a Wi-Fi
network, “remote devices communicate with the network access points by way of radio wave transmissions”). Wi-Fi networks operate on a specific portion of
the radio spectrum allocated by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). See In the Matter of Authorization of Spread Spectrum and Other Wideband
Emissions Not Presently Provided for in the FCC
Rules and Regulations, 101 F.C.C.2d 419, 428-430
¶¶ 27-37 (1985). Wi-Fi is now the most common method for accessing the Internet. Newton’s Telecom Dictionary 1265 (26th ed. 2011). Every Wi-Fi device is assigned a unique number called a media access control
(MAC) address, and routers and other access points are
assigned an alpha-numeric service set identifier (SSID).
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See Jacobson & Idziorek, Computer Security Literacy:
Staying Safe in a Digital World 195, 208 (2013). Routers broadcast those SSIDs, which can be detected by
computers, smartphones, and other devices with wireless capability. Id. at 195, 205.
The owner of a Wi-Fi network can choose to encrypt the network, often requiring users to enter a
password before joining. Encryption prevents others
from using the network and blocks public access to the
information transmitted over the network. An unencrypted or open network is not similarly protected, and
the information transmitted across the network may be
acquired by the public. Indeed, Wi-Fi networks may be
used to broadcast information to the public, such as
subtitles translating live theater or advertisements
broadcast to users of a public network. See Theatre
Performances Available in Eight Languages, BBC
News, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8380266.stm
(last updated Nov. 26, 2009); Free Wireless Upgrades at
Metro Airport Include Unlimited Minutes, Detroit
Free Press, Sept. 17, 2013, at A9.
3. Google is a company specializing in Internetrelated services and products. Among its many products is an online mapping service called Street View,
which provides panoramic, street-level photographs.
App. 3a. Cameras mounted on cars that drive down
public roads take the photographs available through
Street View. Id. During the relevant period, the cars
were also equipped with off-the-shelf radio equipment
and commercially available software that allowed Google
to collect identifying network information (MAC addresses and SSIDs) from Wi-Fi networks along the road.
Id. Google collected that network identifying information to enhance its “location aware” services, which
allow users to retrieve geographically relevant infor-
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mation about local weather, nearby restaurants, and
points of interest. Id. Because Wi-Fi networks have a
limited range, networks can act as unique landmarks
that make it possible to estimate mobile device users’
locations. Many databases of network identifying information exist for this purpose. See McKinsey Global
Inst., Big Data: The Next Frontier for Innovation,
Competition, and Productivity 85-94 (2011), available at
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/business_technology/
big_data_the_next_frontier_for_innovation.
In addition to collecting identifying information
about Wi-Fi networks, Google’s Street View cars also
collected so-called “payload data” that was sent over
unencrypted Wi-Fi networks if the data was being
broadcast at the moment the Street View cars passed
within range of the networks. App. 4a. Google did not
use any of this data in any product or service. Upon
learning of the collection of payload data, Google took
its Street View cars off the road and segregated the
payload data the cars had collected. Id.
The Department of Justice, the Federal Trade
Commission, and the FCC opened investigations of
Google, including for possible violations of the Wiretap
Act and Communications Act. All three ultimately declined to take enforcement action. See Kerr, Justice
Department Closes Probe Into Google Street View,
CNET, Apr. 26, 2012, available at http://news
.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57422652-93/justice-departmentcloses-probe-into-google-street-view/; Ltr. to Gidari,
Esq., Counsel for Google, from Vladeck, Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection (Oct. 27, 2010), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/clos
ing_letters/google-inquiry/101027googleletter.pdf; In the
Matter of Google Inc., 27 FCC Rcd 4012 (2012).
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4. In response to Google’s public acknowledgment, more than a dozen putative class-action lawsuits
were filed around the country, and eventually transferred by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
to the Northern District of California. App. 4a. Respondents allege that payload data transmitted over
their unencrypted Wi-Fi networks was collected by
Google and seek to represent a class of all individuals
whose Wi-Fi payload data was similarly collected. Id.
Respondents filed a consolidated class action complaint
asserting violations of the federal Wiretap Act as well
as various state wiretap laws and California’s unfair
competition law. Id.
5. The district court dismissed Respondents’
state-law claims on preemption and standing grounds,
but held that Respondents’ complaint stated a claim
under the Wiretap Act. App. 65a-101a.1 The court recognized that 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16), which establishes
that unencrypted radio communications are “readily
accessible to the general public,” serves to define the
scope of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i), which permits the acquisition of “electronic communications” that are “readily accessible to the general public.” Because all radio
communications are a form of electronic communication, the court held that the acquisition of such communications in unencrypted form is exempt from liability
under the Wiretap Act. App. 86a, 89a. Thus, the court
concluded, radio communications are “readily accessible
to the general public” and not covered by the Wiretap
Act unless the radio communications are “scrambled or
encrypted” or transmitted by one of the other restricted methods specified in § 2510(16).
1

Judge Ware issued the order under review; Judge Breyer
now presides over the proceedings in the district court in this case.
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But the court then defined “radio communication”
narrowly so as to exclude unencrypted Wi-Fi transmissions. “Radio communication” is undefined in the Wiretap Act, but the district court declined to give the term
its ordinary meaning—and the meaning it has long held
in the telecommunications field—of simply all communications transmitted via radio waves. Instead, the
court held that “radio communication” includes only
“traditional radio services,” or “public-directed radio
broadcast communication,” and not other technologies
that communicate via radio waves such as unencrypted
Wi-Fi networks and cellular phones. App. 87a-90a.
Having concluded that unencrypted Wi-Fi transmissions are not “radio communications,” the court held
that Respondents had adequately alleged that those
transmissions were “electronic communications” not
“readily accessible to the general public” under
§ 2511(2)(g)(i) and thus subject to the Wiretap Act’s interception prohibition. App. 92a-95a.
Google asked the district court to certify its Wiretap Act ruling for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b). The district court granted Google’s request,
and the Ninth Circuit granted Google’s petition for
permission to appeal.
6. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. App. 1a-30a. Like
the district court, the court of appeals held that the definition of radio communications “readily accessible to
the general public” in § 2510(16) applies to the
§ 2511(2)(g)(i) exemption to the prohibition on interception of electronic communications. App. 8a-10a. The
court explained that the Act expressly provides that
“radio communication” is a subset of “electronic communication,” and noted that “the statute directs us to
apply § 2510(16) to the entire chapter.” App. 8a-9a.
Thus, the appeals court concluded, a radio communica-
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tion is deemed “readily accessible to the general public”
and not covered by the Wiretap Act unless “scrambled
or encrypted” or transmitted in another manner specified in § 2510(16). App. 10a-11a.
Rejecting both the district court’s definition and
the one offered by Respondents, however, the court of
appeals created its own unprecedented and untenably
narrow definition of “radio communication.” The court
acknowledged that because “radio communication” is
not defined in the Wiretap Act, the court should give
the term its ordinary meaning. App. 11a. Nevertheless, it rejected the conclusion that “radio communication” under the Wiretap Act, as in other related statutes, refers simply to any information transmitted using radio waves. App. 12a-14a. Instead, in the court of
appeals’ view, the “ordinary meaning” of the term “radio communication” is “a predominantly auditory
broadcast.” App. 15a. Thus, the court held that because the Wi-Fi transmissions Google acquired were
not “predominantly auditory,” they did not constitute
radio communications under the Act. App. 15a-16a.
In so holding, the court gave the phrases “radio
communication” and “communication by radio”—both
of which are used in the Wiretap Act—fundamentally
different constructions. The court concluded that Congress intended to use the latter phrase “more expansively” to include “all communications using radio
waves or a radio device.” App. 16a-17a. In reaching
this conclusion, the court declined to apply the established definition in the Communications Act, which expressly defines “radio communication” and “communication by radio” to mean the same thing: “the transmission by radio of writing, signs, signals, pictures, and
sounds of all kinds.” 47 U.S.C. § 153(40); App. 13a-25a.

9
The court of appeals denied Google’s request for
rehearing en banc on December 27, 2013.2
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
The term “radio communication” has for decades
had an accepted meaning in the telecommunications
field: a transmission of writing, signs, signals, pictures,
or sounds using radio waves. That meaning dates back
at least to the Communications Act of 1934, and is the
established understanding of the term applied by
courts and by the FCC. Here, however, the Ninth Circuit rejected that long-established definition. Instead,
the court of appeals grafted an unprecedented limitation onto the meaning of “radio communication” under
the Wiretap Act in holding that the term encompasses
only “predominantly auditory broadcasts.” That interpretation defies established federal law, renders elements of the Wiretap Act incoherent, muddies the relationship between the Wiretap Act and the Communications Act, and improperly narrows the scope of the
Act’s exemptive provisions.
The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation is not only
wrong, it is also at odds with the reality of modern
technologies, which erase any plausible line between
“auditory” and “non-auditory” transmissions. A packet
of data delivering voice is indistinguishable as it travels
over radio waves from a packet of data delivering text.
The court of appeals’ opinion staked its definition of
“radio communication” on a distinction that is entirely
illusory. In doing so, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation
2

The court of appeals initially issued an opinion on September 10, 2013. App. 31a-64a. Following Google’s petition for rehearing, the panel amended its original opinion on December 27, 2013
by deleting its discussion of an additional issue. App. 1a-30a. It is
the amended opinion that is the subject of this petition.
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creates significant ambiguity in an area of law where
there is a need for clarity. Indeed, the court of appeals
itself acknowledged that it was unsure how its novel
interpretation applies to the billions of cell phone calls
made in the United States each day.
The ruling creates substantial uncertainty regarding the scope of civil and criminal liability under the
Wiretap Act—uncertainty that is particularly troubling
given the ubiquity of modern information technologies,
such as Wi-Fi, that involve the transmission of digital
information by radio, and the potential for sizeable
statutory damage awards under the Act. In light of all
these considerations, the Court should grant the petition and resolve the important question of federal statutory construction that this case presents.
I.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S NOVEL GLOSS ON “RADIO
COMMUNICATION” CONFLICTS WITH THE TERM’S
LONG-ESTABLISHED MEANING AND WITH THE WIRETAP A CT’ S T EXT A ND P URPOSE
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Interpretation Is Inconsistent With The Established Meaning Of
“Radio Communication” In The Telecommunications Field And Under Federal Law

The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of “radio communication” as limited to “predominantly auditory
broadcasts” fails to give that term its established and
accepted meaning under federal law. When Congress
added “radio communication” to the Wiretap Act in
1986, the term had been defined for decades in related
statutes. The Communications Act of 1934 expressly
defined “radio communication” as “the transmission by
radio of writing, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds of
all kinds.” Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 3(b), 48 Stat. 1064, 1065
(1934) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 153(4)). And even before,

11
the Radio Act of 1927 had defined the term as “any intelligence, message, signal, power, pictures, or communication of any nature transferred by electrical energy
from one point to another without the aid of any wire
connecting the points from and at which the electrical
energy is sent or received and any system by means of
which such transfer of energy is effected.” Pub. L. No.
69-632, § 31, 44 Stat. 1162, 1173 (1927). Absent any indication to the contrary, the term “radio communication” should be read consistently across the Wiretap
Act and these related statutes. See, e.g., Northcross v.
Memphis Board of Educ., 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973) (per
curiam) (“The similarity of language in [two statutes]
is, of course, a strong indication that the two statutes
should be interpreted pari passu.”); Gozlon-Peretz v.
United States, 498 U.S. 395, 407-408 (1991) (when construing “specialized statutory terms,” courts “refer to
other, related legislative enactments”).
Congress intended the Communications Act and
the Wiretap Act to be construed in tandem. The two
statutes expressly cross-reference each other. See 47
U.S.C. § 605(a) (Communications Act referencing Wiretap Act); 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(iii) (Wiretap Act referencing Communications Act). And various provisions
of the two statutes address the same subject matter,
including provisions prohibiting interception that Congress intended to be read together. See Edwards v.
State Farm Ins. Co., 833 F.2d 535, 540 (5th Cir. 1987)
(Wiretap Act limits the scope of § 605 of the Communications Act because “Congress likely intended to make
the statutes consistent”); United States v. Rose, 669
F.2d 23, 26 (1st Cir. 1982) (“When Congress passed [the
Wiretap Act] …, it simultaneously amended § 605 to
state that § 605 does not apply to communications that
may be intercepted and disclosed under [the Wiretap

12
Act] by prefacing § 605’s prohibition against disclosure
with the words ‘(e)xcept as authorized by (Title III).’”
(alterations in original)). There is no plausible basis to
construe the term “radio communication” differently
across two statutes so closely intertwined.
See
Kozoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974).
Yet that is precisely what the court of appeals did
here. It gave the term “radio communication” in the
Wiretap Act an entirely different meaning than it has
in the Communications Act. That result is particularly
confounding because the Ninth Circuit’s countertextual definition diverges from the established meaning of “radio communication” in the telecommunications
field. “Radio communication” is generally understood
to mean “any communication using radio waves.”
Meadows et al., Dictionary of New Information Technology 151 (1982) (emphasis added). “Radio communication” has long been understood to encompass transmissions of all kinds—auditory, visual, and otherwise—
over radio waves. Indeed, an electronics dictionary
from the 1940s defined the term (consistent with the
Communications Act) as “[t]he transmission by radio of
writing, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds of all
kinds.” Cooke & Markus, Electronics Dictionary 303
(1st ed. 1945); see also Newton’s Telecom Dictionary
948 (26th ed. 2011) (defining “radio communication” as
“[a]ny telecommunication by means of radio waves”).
The FCC’s longstanding definition of “radio communication” also clearly encompasses non-auditory radio transmissions. Under FCC rules, “radiocommunications” are all “[t]elecommunication[s] by means of radio waves.” 47 C.F.R. § 2.1; see also In re Petition by
Hawaiian Tel. Co., 16 F.C.C.2d 308, 310 (1969) (“A [television] broadcast signal is a radio communication.”).
Not surprisingly, therefore, the FCC’s review of
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Google’s Street View activities never contemplated
that “radio communication” under the Wiretap Act
would not encompass Wi-Fi transmissions. See In the
Matter of Google, Inc., 27 FCC Rcd 4012, 4033-4034
¶¶ 51-53 (2012).
The Ninth Circuit ignored all of this authority. Instead, it gave “radio communication” a new definition
based on the panel’s unsupported beliefs about the
term’s “ordinary meaning.” Yet not only is the panel’s
definition contrary to every dictionary and supported by
no other authorities, it also defies the way the term “radio” is actually used in common parlance, where it has
never been limited to technologies that are predominantly auditory. For example, “packet radio” involves
“the transmission of data over radio.” Newton’s Telecom
Dictionary 856. And Radio Frequency Identity (RFID)
technology, which uses radio waves to send data rather
than sound, has everyday applications that range from
identifying livestock, to paying highway tolls with EZPass, to tracking retail inventory. Id. at 979.
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Interpretation Is Contradicted By The Text And Structure Of The
Wiretap Act
The Ninth Circuit’s definition of “radio communication” is contrary not only to the term’s established
meaning, but also to the text and structure of the Wiretap Act itself.
1.

“Radio communication” in the Wiretap
Act encompasses transmissions that are
not “predominantly auditory”

The Wiretap Act identifies as “radio communications” a number of transmissions that are not “predominantly auditory broadcasts.” The Ninth Circuit’s re-
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strictive definition, accordingly, cannot be squared with
the Act’s plain text.
Section 2510(16) lists several kinds of “radio communications” that contain substantial non-auditory content, such as text and pictures. For example, communications “carried on a subcarrier or other signal subsidiary to a radio transmission,” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16)(C),
include “data carried on the Vertical Blanking Interval
(VBI) of a television signal,” S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 15
(1986). VBI communication is not predominantly auditory—it includes “textual and graphic information intended for display on viewing screens.” In re Amendment of Parts 2, 73, & 76, 101 F.C.C.2d 973, 973-974 ¶2
(1985). Yet the Act identifies VBI communication as
“radio communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16)(C). Similarly, the Act forbids the interception of visual display
pagers, “which involve the transmission of alphanumeric characters over the radio,” S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 15,
because they are a form of “radio communication” “carried by a common carrier,” id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16)(D).
Moreover, none of the “radio communications”
transmitted on radio frequencies “allocated under part
25 and subparts D … or F of part 74” of the FCC’s rules,
18 U.S.C. § 2510(16)(E), are restricted to “predominantly auditory broadcasts.” Those “radio communications”
cover satellite broadcasts, including satellite television.
47 C.F.R. §§ 25.101-25.701. They also include Remote
Pickup Broadcast Stations for “AM, FM, … [and] TV …
station[s],” id. §§ 74.431, 74.432, which are used “for the
transmission of material from the scene of events which
occur outside the studio back to studio or production
center,” id. § 74.432(a). See H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, at 38
(1986) (the specified subparts of Part 74 include “video
and audio transmissions from a news team in the field to
the studio, and transmission from the studio to the
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transmitter site”). And they include frequencies that
are reserved for television broadcast auxiliary stations,
and are used for the “transmission of TV program material and related communication.” 47 C.F.R. §§ 74.600,
74.601. Nor are the “radio communications” described
in § 2511(2)(g)(ii) limited to “predominantly auditory
broadcasts.” In particular, “radio communication which
is transmitted by any station for the use of the general
public,” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(ii)(I), includes “television
broadcast signals,” H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, at 42 n.86—a
type of transmission that, of course, is not “predominantly auditory.”
In short, the following non-auditory communications are clearly “radio communications” under the
Wiretap Act:
•

Display paging systems

•

Data carried on the VBI of a television signal

•

Television broadcasts

•

Satellite transmissions (including satellite TV)

•

Video transmissions from field reporters

These examples unmistakably demonstrate that
the Wiretap Act itself does not limit the term “radio
communication” to “predominantly auditory” transmissions. It is thus unsurprising that there is no support in
the case law or any other authority for the Ninth Circuit’s restrictive definition.
These provisions also reveal the incongruity of construing “communication by radio” differently from “radio communication,” as the Ninth Circuit did. App. 16a18a. For one, the two terms are just different formulations of the same words. Just as “travel by train”
means the same thing as “train travel,” “radio commu-
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nication” and “communication by radio” are synonymous. The Ninth Circuit’s claim that “communication
by radio” is “used more expansively” to include “all
communications using radio waves,” while “radio communication” “refer[s] more narrowly to broadcast radio
technologies” is baseless. App. 16a-17a. The term “radio communication” as used in the Act encompasses far
more than “auditory broadcasts,” as the provisions described above illustrate; the fact that “communication
by radio” also encompasses non-auditory transmissions
simply confirms the scope of both terms.
2.

A central element of the Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning—that “radio communication”
does not encompass television—is plainly wrong under established telecommunications law

A central premise of the court of appeals’ restrictive definition was that “[o]ne would not ordinarily consider, say, television a form of “‘radio communication.’”
App. 12a. This further exposes the court’s error, however, as it is clear from the Wiretap Act’s text and legislative history that “radio communication” does encompass both broadcast and satellite television.
As explained above, at p. 14, subpart (E) of
§ 2510(16) categorizes transmissions over the radio frequencies allocated under part 25 of the FCC Rules as
radio communications. Those frequencies are reserved
for satellite communications, including satellite television. 47 C.F.R. §§ 25.101-25.701; see United States v.
Shriver, 989 F.2d 898, 902 (7th Cir. 1992) (describing satellite television transmissions as “radio communications”). Moreover, it is clear that § 2511(2)(g)(ii)(I)’s reference to any “radio communication which is transmitted by any station for the use of the general public” was
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intended to include broadcast television. See H.R. Rep.
No. 99-647, at 42 n.86 (“television broadcast signals”).
Other federal courts have consistently classified
television as a form of “radio communication.” See, e.g.,
DirecTV, Inc. v. FCC, 110 F.3d 816, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(satellite television “is a radio communication service”);
Shriver, 989 F.2d at 902; Winchester TV Cable Co. v.
FCC, 462 F.2d 115, 118 n.9 (4th Cir. 1972) (“Radio
communication, of course, includes television.”). The
FCC has long held the same position. See In re Petition by Hawaiian Tel. Co., 16 F.C.C.2d 308, 310, ¶ 9
(1969) (“A [television] broadcast signal is a radio communication[.]”).
The Ninth Circuit nevertheless based its analysis
on the erroneous belief (at App. 12a) that Congress does
not “assume[] that the term ‘radio’ encompasses the
term ‘television.’” To support this conclusion, the court
identified other statutes in which Congress referred to
both “radio” and “television”—an observation that has
no bearing on whether “radio communication” as used in
the Wiretap Act encompasses television transmissions.
App. 12a-13a. In any event, the other statutes cited by
the Ninth Circuit use the word “radio” but do not even
contain the term “radio communication,” and they are
not telecommunications statutes at all. See 18 U.S.C.
§§1343 (criminal mail fraud), 2101 (criminal incitement
of a riot); 7 U.S.C. § 2156 (animal fighting). The far
more apt comparison is to the Communications Act,
which operates in tandem with the Wiretap Act, and
unquestionably includes television in the definition of
“radio communication.” See infra pp. 10-12.
In sum, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of “radio
communication” is unprecedented, at odds with the
statutory text and legislative history, and conflicts with
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established interpretations of the term under federal
law, as recognized by other courts and by the FCC.
The Court should grant review to resolve the fundamental question the court of appeals’ decision raises
about the scope of the Wiretap Act.
II. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION FAILS TO ACCOUNT
FOR MODERN TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND
WILL HAVE WIDE-RANGING HARMFUL CONSEQUENCES
The Ninth Circuit’s holding is not merely wrong. It
is technologically unsound and creates serious practical
problems in applying the Wiretap Act. Certiorari is
warranted to restore coherence to this significant federal statute.
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Definition Draws A Line
Between “Auditory” And “Non-Auditory”
Transmissions That Has Become Meaningless
The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of “radio communication” rests on a distinction between “auditory”
and “non-auditory” transmissions that has effectively
disappeared with the evolution of modern communications technology. As a result, the court’s decision
threatens incoherence in the application of the Wiretap
Act to the information technology industry.
While analog telephone lines or CB radios once carried “voice” or “auditory” transmissions distinct from
other forms of transmission, that is no longer the case.
Today, many voice calls are transmitted in packets of
data using the “voice over Internet protocol” (VoIP),
not only through services such as Skype and Vonage
but even by primary telephone and cable providers.
See, e.g., United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d
701, 706 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Many phone calls today are
made by digitizing speech and transferring the result
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by packet switching.”); Nagesh, FCC to Vote on Scrapping Telecom Landlines, Wall St. J., Jan. 30, 2014, at
B3 (“VoIP is already offered by a number of phone and
cable companies” and carriers such as AT&T and Verizon “want to retire their existing, circuit-switched systems and move to systems based on Internet protocol—
essentially treating phone calls like other data moving
over the Internet.”).
Other technologies have further blurred any “auditory”-“non-auditory” line. Text messages can be sent
as voice messages that travel the Internet (and the
airwaves) just like any other form of data. And technologies such as Apple’s Siri or Google’s Voice Search
allow users to “speak” to a computer system over the
Internet—to ask directions or to search the web—and
provide for the system to “speak” back. See Apple Inc.
v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 695 F.3d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (“Advertised by Apple as an ‘intelligent personal
assistant,’ Siri enables iPhone 4S users to speak their
commands to the phone in a natural and conversational
tone. … [C]onsumers often use Siri in ways that include looking for information.”).
In the world of Internet protocol communications, a
bit of data is simply a bit of data. The Ninth Circuit’s
decision offers no intelligible rationale for distinguishing “auditory” bits from “non-auditory” ones.
B. The Decision Below Creates Significant Uncertainty Regarding The Scope Of The Wiretap Act
Even as to more established technologies, the
Ninth Circuit’s restrictive definition of “radio communication” introduces significant uncertainty in the application of the Wiretap Act. Indeed, the court of appeals’ decision calls into question how the Act applies to

20
basic modern technologies such as television and cell
phone communications.
Consider the acquisition of television broadcast
signals—watching TV—which, absent some exception,
the Wiretap Act would prohibit. Television constitutes
“wire communication” under 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1), (18),
because it often contains “the human voice” and is generally transmitted “by the aid of wire, cable, or other
like connection,” such as a cable television system. As
such, it does not qualify for the exception in
§ 2511(2)(g)(i) for electronic communications that are
“readily accessible to the general public” because wire
communications are specifically excluded from the definition of electronic communications. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(12)(A).
Congress
evidently
intended
§ 2511(2)(g)(ii)(I)—covering any “radio communication
which is transmitted by any station for the use of the
general public”—to shield television from the prohibition on interception of electronic communications. H.R.
Rep. No. 99-647, at 42 n.86. But under the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation, that exception would not apply
because in its view “radio communication” does not encompass television. Surely Congress did not intend to
criminalize watching television. The fact that the Ninth
Circuit’s opinion, taken to its logical conclusion, suggests otherwise highlights the error of the court’s interpretation and the mischief it may cause.
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit’s definition creates
doubt as to whether intercepting transmissions from
“public safety communications systems” and “marine or
aeronautical communications systems” would be protected from liability under § 2511(2)(g)(ii), as Congress
intended, if such transmissions contained non-auditory
information. Increasingly, such transmissions do contain non-auditory information—they contain data. See,
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e.g., National Telecommunications & Information Administration, About FirstNet, available at http://www.
ntia.doc.gov/page/about-firstnet (last visited Mar. 27,
2014) (describing broadband data network for first responders).
Perhaps even more remarkably, the Ninth Circuit’s
opinion calls into question whether ordinary cell phone
calls are protected from interception under the Wiretap
Act. The opinion itself acknowledges that, under its
reading of the law, whether cell phone calls satisfy the
“broadcast” portion of its “predominantly audio broadcast” test and thus qualify as radio communications is a
“close question.” App. 15a. That acknowledgment
leaves the tens of millions of cell phone users in the
Ninth Circuit uncertain about whether their calls can
lawfully be intercepted—and highlights the error of the
court’s interpretation. It is clear from the Act’s legislative history that Congress viewed cell phone communications as “radio communications” and intended the
“common carrier” provision in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16)(D)
to protect cell phone communications from interception.
See H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, at 32 (“Because cellular
communication is transmitted over a communication
system currently regarded by the FCC as a common
carrier, the Committee also intends that such communication not be considered ‘readily accessible to the
general public’ at any time subsequent to the date of
enactment, regardless of how a provider of cellular service is denominated by any state or how the FCC may
classify any such provider in the future.” (footnote
omitted)). By leaving open whether cell phone transmissions are “radio communications,” the Ninth Circuit
has created ambiguity in an area where Congress intended certainty.
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In short, the Ninth Circuit’s decision is out of step
with modern technology and introduces significant ambiguities in the application of the Wiretap Act, creating
uncertainty about how the Act applies even to everyday technological activities.3
C. The Ninth Circuit’s Holding Casts Doubt On
The Legality Of Standard Security Procedures
In The Information Technology Industry
Review is also warranted because the Ninth Circuit’s decision potentially renders unlawful—and subjects to possible criminal liability—security procedures
that are standard in the information technology (IT)
industry. IT professionals routinely use the same kind
of technology as Google’s Street View cars did to collect
packet data in order to secure company networks. And
unlike Google, which never used the payload data it collected, security professionals also parse and analyze the
data collected from wired and wireless networks, including networks operated by other persons or entities,
to identify vulnerabilities in and potential attacks on
the networks they protect. See generally Mateti,
Hacking Techniques in Wireless Networks, in 3 Handbook of Information Security 83, 83-93 (Hossein Bidgoli
ed., 2006). For example, IT security experts use packet
analysis to monitor wireless traffic in order to create a
list of all access points in use. This allows them to detect unauthorized or rogue Wi-Fi access points in the
3

Because the Wiretap Act is a criminal statute, the rule of
lenity required the court to resolve any ambiguity in Petitioner’s
favor and to adopt the established definition of “radio communication.” See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004) (“Because
we must interpret the statute consistently, whether we encounter
its application in a criminal or noncriminal context, the rule of lenity applies.”). But far from resolving any ambiguity in the Act, the
court of appeals’ decision compounded it.
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network—i.e., unapproved Wi-Fi networks that may be
set up by employees to circumvent network security or
by attackers to infiltrate the company’s network. See,
e.g., Beyah & Venkataraman, Rogue-Access-Point Detection: Challenges, Solutions, and Future Directions,
IEEE 56-57 (Sept./Oct. 2011).
These types of security measures are critical.
Networks that connect company computers to each
other and to the Internet are vulnerable to hacking and
other security breaches, even when they are properly
encrypted. See generally Mateti, supra, at 83-90.
Moreover, federal statutes and regulations require certain entities, such as healthcare providers and financial
institutions, to meet network security standards. See
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act,
42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 (information security for health information); 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.306, 164.308, 164.312 (associated regulations); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 6801 (information security for financial institutions);
Interagency Guidelines Establishing Standards for
Safeguarding Customer Information and Rescission of
Year 2000 Standards for Safety and Soundness, 66
Fed. Reg. 8616 (Feb. 1, 2001) (associated regulations).
Packet analysis can also help to enforce company
policies prohibiting employees from bringing unauthorized wireless devices to worksites by tracking the addresses of all Wi-Fi devices using the network. And it
can be used to optimize network performance by, for
example, analyzing traffic to determine how to decrease
packet loss. See, e.g., Nisar et al., 2010 International
Symposium, Enhanced Performance of Packet Transmission Using System Model Over VoIP Network, Information Technology (ITSim) 1005-1008 (June 2010).
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Each of these legitimate uses of packet analysis
technology could result in the acquisition of payload data from nearby unencrypted Wi-Fi networks. The
technology does not distinguish between company signals and external signals—indeed doing so would defeat
its security purpose. Thus, packet analysis will often
collect data from any open Wi-Fi network within range.
In densely populated areas, this will likely include individual home networks of the sort Respondents claim to
operate. Rather than providing a clear definition that
IT security professionals could rely on, the Ninth Circuit’s definition imperils an important IT security tool.
D. Whether Unencrypted Wi-Fi Communications
Are Covered By The Wiretap Act Presents A
Significant Legal Issue
Various courts in recent years have confronted the
application of the Wiretap Act to unencrypted Wi-Fi
transmissions, and none has adopted the Ninth Circuit’s erroneous interpretation. In In re Innovatio IP
Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 886 F. Supp. 2d 888, 894
(N.D. Ill. 2012), a plaintiff in a patent infringement action sought an admissibility ruling on its proposed discovery protocol to collect evidence using packet analysis (or “sniffing”) technology. The court held that the
proposed protocol would not violate the Wiretap Act
because “in light of the ease of ‘sniffing’ Wi-Fi networks
… the communications sent on an unencrypted Wi-Fi
network are readily accessible to the general public.”
Id. at 893.
Similarly, in United States v. Ahrndt, Crim No. 08468, 2010 WL 373994 (D. Or. Jan. 28, 2010) rev’d on other grounds and remanded, 475 F. App’x 656 (9th Cir.
2012), the defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence
collected from his shared iTunes library, which the of-
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ficer accessed via defendant’s unsecured Wi-Fi network. The court rejected the argument that the officer’s conduct violated the Wiretap Act, holding that
since defendant’s Wi-Fi network was unencrypted, it
was “configured so that any electronic communications
emanating from his computer … were readily accessible to any member of the general public with a Wi-Fi
enabled laptop.” Arndt, 2010 WL 373994, at *8.
Given the ubiquity of Wi-Fi and the availability of
packet-analysis technology, issues regarding the application of the Wiretap Act to Wi-Fi transmissions will
continue to arise and with increasing frequency. The
significance of the issue is all the greater because the
Wiretap Act provides for statutory damages, in appropriate cases, in the amount of the greater of $100 per
day for each day of violation or $10,000. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2520(c)(B). Defendants therefore face significant potential damages for conduct that would be innocent absent the Ninth Circuit’s erroneous interpretation. This
Court should intervene now and settle the uncertainty
regarding the application of the Wiretap Act to Wi-Fi
transmissions.
*

*

*

The decision below manufactures a definition of
“radio communication” that is at odds with established
federal law and with the text, structure, and legislative
history of the Wiretap Act. The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation is based on a purported distinction between
non-auditory and auditory radio transmissions that is
illusory in modern communications technologies. The
decision thus creates significant complications regarding application of the Wiretap Act to information technologies and introduces significant legal uncertainty.
In light of the clear error of the court of appeals’ deci-
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sion, and the decision’s ramifications for the information technology industry, the Court should grant review on this important question of federal statutory interpretation.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be
granted.
Respectfully submitted.
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-17483
D.C. No. 5:10-md-02184-JW
BENJAMIN JOFFE; LILLA MARIGZA; RICK BENITTI;
BERTHA DAVIS; JASON TAYLOR; ERIC MYHRE; JOHN E.
REDSTONE; MATTHEW BERLAGE; PATRICK KEYES;
KARL H. SCHULZ; JAMES FAIRBANKS; AARON LINSKY;
DEAN M. BASTILLA; VICKI VAN VALIN; JEFFREY
COLMAN; RUSSELL CARTER; STEPHANIE CARTER;
JENNIFER LOCSIN,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
GOOGLE, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
James Ware, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted
June 10, 2013—San Francisco, California
Filed September 10, 2013
Amended December 27, 2013
ORDER AND AMENDED OPINION
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Before: A. Wallace Tashima and Jay S. Bybee, Circuit
Judges, and William H. Stafford, Senior District Judge.*
Opinion by Judge Bybee
*

*

*

ORDER
Appellant’s motion for leave to file a reply brief in
support of its petition for rehearing and rehearing en
banc, filed on November 6, 2013, is GRANTED.
Appellant’s petition for rehearing, filed on
September 24, 2013, is GRANTED IN PART. The
court’s opinion, filed on September 10, 2013, and
appearing at 729 F.3d 1362 (9th Cir. 2013), is hereby
AMENDED. An amended opinion is filed concurrently
with this order.
Judge Bybee votes to deny Appellant’s petition for
rehearing en banc, filed on September 24, 2013, and
Judge Tashima and Judge Stafford so recommend. The
full court has been advised of Appellant’s petition for
rehearing en banc, and no request to vote on whether
to rehear the case en banc has been made. Appellant’s
petition for rehearing en banc is DENIED.
No subsequent petitions for rehearing or rehearing
en banc shall be filed by either party.
OPINION
BYBEE, Circuit Judge:
In the course of capturing its Street View
photographs, Google collected data from unencrypted
* The Honorable William H. Stafford, Jr., Senior District
Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Florida, sitting by designation.
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Wi-Fi networks.
Google publicly apologized, but
plaintiffs brought suit under federal and state law,
including the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511. Google
argues that its data collection did not violate the Act
because data transmitted over a Wi-Fi network is an
“electronic communication” that is “readily accessible
to the general public” and exempt under the Act. 18
U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i). The district court rejected
Google’s argument. In re Google Inc. St. View Elec.
Commc’n Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1073–84 (N.D.
Cal. 2011). We affirm.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. Facts and History
Google launched its Street View feature in the
United States in 2007 to complement its Google Maps
service by providing users with panoramic, street-level
photographs. Street View photographs are captured
by cameras mounted on vehicles owned by Google that
drive on public roads and photograph their
surroundings. Between 2007 and 2010, Google also
equipped its Street View cars with Wi-Fi antennas and
software that collected data transmitted by Wi-Fi
networks in nearby homes and businesses.
The
equipment attached to Google’s Street View cars
recorded basic information about these Wi-Fi
networks, including the network’s name (SSID), the
unique number assigned to the router transmitting the
wireless signal (MAC address), the signal strength, and
whether the network was encrypted. Gathering this
basic data about the Wi-Fi networks used in homes and
businesses enables companies such as Google to provide
enhanced “location-based” services, such as those that
allow mobile phone users to find nearby restaurants
and attractions or receive driving directions.
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But the antennas and software installed in Google’s
Street View cars collected more than just the basic
identifying information transmitted by Wi-Fi networks.
They also gathered and stored “payload data” that was
sent and received over unencrypted Wi-Fi connections
at the moment that a Street View car was driving by.1
Payload data includes everything transmitted by a
device connected to a Wi-Fi network, such as personal
emails, usernames, passwords, videos, and documents.
Google acknowledged in May 2010 that its Street
View vehicles had been collecting fragments of payload
data from unencrypted Wi-Fi networks. The company
publicly apologized, grounded its vehicles, and
rendered inaccessible the personal data that had been
acquired. In total, Google’s Street View cars collected
about 600 gigabytes of data transmitted over Wi-Fi
networks in more than 30 countries.
Several putative class-action lawsuits were filed
shortly after Google’s announcement, and, in August
2010, the cases were transferred by the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation to the Northern District of
California. In November, 2010, Plaintiffs-Appellees
(collectively “Joffe”) filed a consolidated complaint,
asserting claims against Google under the federal
Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511; California Business and
Professional Code § 17200; and various state wiretap
statutes. Joffe seeks to represent a class comprised of
all persons whose electronic communications were
intercepted by Google Street View vehicles since May
25, 2007.
1

Google may have also used its software to capture
encrypted data, but the plaintiffs have conceded that their
wireless networks were unencrypted.
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Google moved to dismiss Joffe’s consolidated
complaint. The district court declined to grant Google’s
motion to dismiss Joffe’s federal Wiretap Act claims.2
In re Google Inc. St. View Elec. Commc’n Litig., 794 F.
Supp. 2d at 1084. On Google’s request, the court
certified its ruling for interlocutory appeal under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b) because the district court resolved a
novel question of statutory interpretation. We granted
Google’s petition, and we have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b).
B. District Court’s Decision
Google maintained before the district court that it
should have dismissed Joffe’s Wiretap Act claims
because data transmitted over unencrypted Wi-Fi
networks falls under the statutory exemption that
makes
it
lawful
to
intercept
“electronic
communications” that are “readily accessible tothe
general public.” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i). The question
was whether payload data transmitted on an
unencrypted Wi-Fi network is “readily accessible to the
general public,” such that the § 2511(2)(g)(i) exemption
applies to Google’s conduct.
To answer this question, the district court first
looked to the definitions supplied by the Act. In re
Google Inc. St. View Elec. Commc’n Litig., 794 F. Supp.
2d at 1075–76. The statute provides in relevant part
that “‘readily accessible to the general public’ means,
with respect to a radio communication, that such
communication is not … (A) scrambled or encrypted.”
2

The district court granted Google’s motion to dismiss Joffe’s
claims under California law and other state wiretap statutes. In re
Google Inc. St. View Elec. Commc’n Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d at
1085–86. These claims are not at issue here.
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18 U.S.C. § 2510(16).
An unencrypted radio
communication is, therefore, “readily accessible to the
general public.” In short, intercepting an unencrypted
radio communication does not give rise to liability
under the Wiretap Act because of the combination of
the § 2511(2)(g)(i) exemption and the § 2510(16)
definition.
The district court then considered whether data
transmitted over a Wi-Fi network is a “radio
communication” because the phrase is not defined by
the Act. In re Google Inc. St. View Elec. Commc’n
Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d at 1076–81. The court reasoned
that “radio communication” encompasses only
“traditional radio services,” and not other technologies
that also transmit data using radio waves, such as
cellular phones and Wi-Fi networks.3 Id. at 1079–83.
Since Wi-Fi networks are not a “radio communication,”
the definition of “readily accessible to the general
public” provided by § 2510(16) does not apply because
the definition is expressly limited to electronic
communications that are radio communications.
Finally, the court addressed whether data
transmitted over unencrypted Wi-Fi networks is
nevertheless an “electronic communication” that is
“readily accessible to the general public” under
§ 2511(2)(g)(i). Id. at 1082–84. Although the court
determined that Wi-Fi networks do not involve a “radio
communication” under § 2510(16) and are therefore not
“readily accessible to the general public” by virtue of
the definition of the phrase, it still had to resolve
whether they are “readily accessible to the general
3

It is less clear whether the district court’s definition also
excludes television broadcasts. Joffe argued at oral argument that
television broadcasts are “traditional radio services.”
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public” as the phrase is ordinarily understood because
the statute does not define the phrase as it applies to an
“electronic communication” that is not a “radio
communication.” The court reasoned that “without
more, merely pleading that a network is unencrypted
does not render that network readily accessible to the
general public and serve to remove the intentional
interception of electronic communications from that
network from liability under the [Electronic
Communications Privacy Act].” Id. at 1084. The court
accordingly declined to grant Google’s motion to
dismiss Joffe’s Wiretap Act claims. Id.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE WIRETAP ACT
The Wiretap Act imposes liability on a person who
“intentionally intercepts … any wire, oral, or electronic
communication,” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a), subject to a
number of exemptions. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)–(h).
There are two exemptions that are relevant to our
purposes. First, the Wiretap Act exempts intercepting
“an electronic communication made through an
electronic communication system” if the system is
configured so that it is “readily accessible to the
general public.” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i). “Electronic
communication” includes communication by radio, 18
U.S.C. § 2510(12), and “‘readily accessible to the
general public’ means, with respect to a radio
communication” that the communication is “not …
scrambled or encrypted,” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16)(A).
Second, the Act exempts intercepting “radio
communication” by “any station for the use of the
general
public;”
by
certain
governmental
communication systems “readily accessible to the
general public,” including police, fire, and civil defense
agencies; by a station operating on an authorized
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frequency for “amateur, citizens band, or general
mobile radio services;” or by a marine or aeronautical
communications system. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(ii)(I)–
(IV).
Google only argues, as it did before the district
court, that it is exempt from liability under the Act
because data transmitted over a Wi-Fi network is an
“electronic communication … readily accessible to the
general public” under § 2511(2)(g)(i). It concedes that it
does not qualify for any of the exemptions for specific
types of “radio communication” under § 2511(2)(g)(ii).
Joffe, however, argues that if data transmitted over a
Wi-Fi network is not exempt as a “radio
communication” under § 2511(2)(g)(ii), it cannot be
exempt as a radio communication under the broader
exemption
for
“electronic
communication”
in
§ 2511(2)(g)(i). This argument has some force, and we
wish to address it before we consider Google’s claims.
Joffe contends that the definition of “readily
accessible to the general public” in § 2510(16) does not
apply to the § 2511(2)(g)(i) exemption. Instead, Joffe
argues, the § 2510(16) definition applies exclusively to
§ 2511(2)(g)(ii)(II),
which
exempts
specifically
enumerated types of “radio communication” when they
are “readily accessible to the general public.” We
ultimately reject Joffe’s alternative reading of the
statute, although—as we will explain—we find
§ 2511(2)(g)(ii) useful as a lexigraphical aid to
understanding the phrase “radio communication.”
As noted, § 2510(16) defines “readily accessible to
the general public” solely with respect to a “radio
communication,” and not with respect to other types of
“electronic communication.” Although § 2511(2)(g)(i)
does not use the words “radio communication,” the
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statute nevertheless directs us to apply the § 2510(16)
definition to the § 2511(2)(g)(i) exemption. First, “radio
communication”
is
a
subset
of
“electronic
communication.” See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (providing
that, subject to certain exceptions, “‘electronic
communication’ means any transfer of signs, signals,
writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any
nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio,
electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical
system”) (emphasis added). Second, the statute directs
us to apply § 2510(16) to the entire chapter. The
definitions in 18 U.S.C. § 2510 are prefaced with the
phrase, “As used in this chapter.” We cannot disregard
this command by holding that the definition of “‘readily
accessible to the general public’ [ ] with respect to a
radio communication” applies to § 2511(2)(g)(ii), but not
§ 2511(2)(g)(i).
Admittedly, following the plain language of the
statute creates some tension with § 2511(2)(g)(ii)(II),
which provides an exemption for intercepting “any
radio communication which is transmitted … by any
governmental, law enforcement, civil defense, private
land mobile, or public communications system,
including police and fire, readily accessible to the
general public.” Under our reading of the statute—
which is the same reading adopted by the district court,
Google, and Joffe in his lead argument—§ 2511(2)(g)(i)
exempts all electronic communications (including radio
communications) that are “readily accessible to the
general public” as the phrase is defined in § 2510(16).
This reading likely renders § 2511(2)(g)(ii)(II)
superfluous.
As discussed, that section exempts
specific kinds of radio communications that are “readily
accessible to the general public,” such as those
transmitted by a law enforcement communications
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system. But this exemption is unnecessary when
§ 2511(2)(g)(i)
already
exempts
all
radio
communications that are “readily accessible to the
general public.”
Although
our
reading
may
render
§ 2511(2)(g)(ii)(II) superfluous or at least redundant, we
understand that Congress “sometimes drafts provisions
that appear duplicative of others—simply in Macbeth’s
words, ‘to make assurance double sure.’ That is,
Congress means to clarify what might be doubtful—
that the mentioned item is covered.” Shook v. D.C.
Fin. Responsibility & Mgmt. Assistance Auth., 132
F.3d 775, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1998). This interpretation is
especially plausible given that Congress was concerned
that radio hobbyists not face liability for intercepting
readily accessible broadcasts, such as those covered by
§ 2511(2)(g)(ii)(II), which can be picked up by a police
scanner. See 132 Cong. Rec. S7987-04 (1986) (“In order
to address radio hobbyists’ concerns, we modified the
original language of S. 1667 to clarify that intercepting
traditional radio services is not unlawful.”).
In short, we agree with Google that the definition
of “readily accessible to the general public” in
§ 2510(16) applies to the § 2511(2)(g)(i) exemption when
the communication in question is a “radio
communication.” With that understanding, we now
turn to whether data transmitted over a Wi-Fi network
is a “radio communication” exempt from the Wiretap
Act as an “electronic communication” under
§ 2511(2)(g)(i).
III. ANALYSIS
Google contends that data transmitted over a WiFi network is a “radio communication” and that the Act
exempts such communications by defining them as
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“readily accessible to the general public,” 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511(2)(g)(i), so long as “such communication is not …
scrambled or encrypted,” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16)(A). We
reject this claim.4 We hold that the phrase “radio
communication” in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16) excludes
payload data transmitted over a Wi-Fi network. As a
consequence, the definition of “readily accessible to the
general public [ ] with respect to a radio
communication” set forth in § 2510(16) does not apply to
the exemption for an “electronic communication” that is
“readily accessible to the general public” under 18
U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i).
A. The Ordinary Meaning of “Radio Communication”
Does Not Include Data Transmitted over a Wi-Fi
Network
The Wiretap Act does not define the phrase “radio
communication” so we must give the term its ordinary
meaning. See Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464,
2471 (2010) (“When terms used in a statute are
undefined, we give them their ordinary meaning.”);
United States v. Daas, 198 F.3d 1167, 1174 (9th Cir.
1999) (“If the statute uses a term which it does not
define, the court gives that term its ordinary
meaning.”).

4

This case raises a question of statutory interpretation,
which we review de novo. Phoenix Mem’l Hosp. v. Sebelius, 622
F.3d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 2010). We begin by “determin[ing]
whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous
meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.”
Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002). We must
assume that “the ordinary meaning of that language accurately
expresses the legislative purpose [of Congress].” Park ’N Fly,
Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985).
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According to Google, radio communication “refers
to any information transmitted using radio waves, i.e.,
the radio frequency portion of the electromagnetic
spectrum.” Appellant’s Br. at 28. The radio frequency
portion of the spectrum is “the part of the spectrum
where electromagnetic waves have frequencies in the
range of about 3 kilohertz to 300 gigahertz.” Id. at 27.
Google’s technical definition does not conform with
the common understanding held contemporaneous with
the enacting Congress. See United States v. Iverson,
162 F.3d 1015, 1022 (9th Cir. 1998) (“When a statute
does not define a term, we generally interpret that
term by employing the ordinary, contemporary, and
common meaning of the words that Congress used”)
(emphasis added). The radio frequency portion of the
electromagnetic spectrum covers not only Wi-Fi
transmissions, but also television broadcasts, Bluetooth
devices, cordless and cellular phones, garage door
openers, avalanche beacons, and wildlife tracking
collars. See Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, Encyclopedia –
FM Broadcast Station Classes and Service Countours,
available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/
2003-allochrt.pdf (last visited Aug. 13, 2013). One
would not ordinarily consider, say, television a form of
“radio communication.” Not surprisingly, Congress has
not typically assumed that the term “radio”
encompasses the term “television.” See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§ 1343 (imposing liability for “[f]raud by wire, radio, or
television”) (emphasis added); 18 U.S.C. § 2101
(imposing liability for inciting a riot by means of “mail,
telegraph, radio, or television”) (emphasis added); 7
U.S.C. § 2156 (defining an “instrumentality of
interstate commerce” as “any written, wire, radio,
television or other form of communication); see also
FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775,
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815 (1978) (noting that “radio and television stations
are given different weight,” under the regulations at
issue, and describing regulations governing “a radio or
television broadcast station”) (emphasis added).
The Wiretap Act itself does not assume that the
phrase
“radio
communication”
encompasses
technologies like satellite television that are outside the
scope of the phrase as it is ordinarily defined. For
example, the statute’s damages provision sets out
specified penalties when the “violation of this chapter is
the private viewing of a private satellite video
communication that is not scrambled or encrypted or if
the communication is a radio communication that is
transmitted on [frequencies specified by regulation].”
18 U.S.C. § 2520(c)(1) (emphasis added). Congress
described separately the act of “viewing [ ] a private
satellite video communication” even though such
communication is transmitted on a radio frequency and
would fall within Google’s proposed definition of “radio
communication.”
Taken together, these disparate
provisions offer evidence that Congress does not use
“radio” or “radio communication” to reference all of the
myriad forms of communication that use the radio
spectrum. Rather, it uses “radio” to refer to traditional
radio technologies, and then separately describes other
modes of communication that are not ordinarily thought
of as radio, but that nevertheless use the radio
spectrum.
Google’s proposed definition is in tension with how
Congress—and virtually everyone else—uses the
phrase. In common parlance, watching a television
show does not entail “radio communication.” Nor does
sending an email or viewing a bank statement while
connected to a Wi-Fi network. There is no indication
that the Wiretap Act carries a buried implication that
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the phrase ought to be given a broader definition than
the one that is commonly understood. See Mohamad v.
Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1707 (2012)
(favoring a definition that matches “how we use the
word in everyday parlance” and observing that
“Congress remains free, as always, to give the word a
broader or different meaning. But before we will
assume it has done so, there must be some indication
Congress intended such a result”).
Importantly, Congress provided definitions for
many other similar terms in the Wiretap Act, but
refrained from providing a technical definition of “radio
communication” that would have altered the notion that
it should carry its common, ordinary meaning. See, e.g.,
18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (defining “wire communication”); 18
U.S.C.
§
2510(12)
(defining
“electronic
communication”); 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (defining
“electronic communication service”); 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(17) (defining “electronic storage”). As Google
writes in its brief, “[t]he fact that the Wiretap Act
provides specialized definitions for certain compound
terms—but not for ‘radio communication’—is powerful
evidence that the undefined term was not similarly
intended [to] be defined in a specialized or narrow way”
but rather “according to its ordinary meaning.”
Appellant’s Br. at 29. We agree and, accordingly, we
reject Google’s proposed definition of “radio
communication” in favor of one that better reflects the
phrase’s ordinary meaning.
B. A “Radio Communication” is a Predominantly
Auditory Broadcast, Which Excludes Payload
Data Transmitted over Wi-Fi Networks
There are two telltale indicia of a “radio
communication.” A radio communication is commonly
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understood to be (1) predominantly auditory, and (2)
broadcast. Therefore, television—whether connected
via an indoor antenna or a satellite dish—is not radio,
by virtue of its visual component. A land line phone
does not broadcast, and, for that reason, is not radio.
On the other hand, AM/FM, Citizens Band (CB),
‘walkie-talkie,’ and shortwave transmissions are
predominantly auditory, are broadcast, and are, not
coincidentally, typically referred to as “radio” in
everyday parlance. Thus, we conclude that “radio
communication” should carry its ordinary meaning: a
predominantly auditory broadcast.5
The payload data transmitted over unencrypted
Wi-Fi networks that was captured by Google included
emails, usernames, passwords, images, and documents
that cannot be classified as predominantly auditory.
They therefore fall outside of the definition of a “radio

5

We need not reach the question of what exactly constitutes
a “broadcast” because the Wi-Fi transmissions in question were
not predominantly auditory. Whether cell phone calls—which are
projected wirelessly over great distances—are broadcast would
similarly be a close question.
We also need not fully consider the extent to which nonauditory transmissions may be included in a broadcast before that
broadcast is no longer a radio broadcast. Modern FM radio
stations, for example, commonly transmit small amounts of data
denoting the artist and title of the song. But because such data is
ancillary to the audio transmission, they likely do not remove the
transmissions from the domain of a “radio communication” under
the Act.
And, finally, we do not address how to classify a traditional
radio broadcast delivered to a web-enabled device connected to a
Wi-Fi network, such as a radio station streamed over the internet.
Here, Google’s collection efforts were not limited to auditory
transmissions.
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communication” as the phrase is used in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(16).
C. Defining “Radio Communication” to Include Only
Predominantly Auditory Broadcasts is Consistent
with the Rest of the Wiretap Act
Crucially, defining “radio communication” as a
predominantly auditory broadcast yields a coherent
and consistent Wiretap Act. Google’s overly broad
definition does not. See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,
486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (“In ascertaining the plain
meaning of the statute, the court must look to the
particular statutory language at issue, as well as the
language and design of the statute as a whole.”)
Throughout the Wiretap Act, Congress used the
phrase “radio communication”—which is at issue
here—and the similar phrase “communication by
radio.” Even within the very provision that we are
construing—18 U.S.C. § 2510(16)—Congress used both
phrases. We must ascribe to each phrase its own
meaning. See SEC v. McCarthy, 322 F.3d 650, 656 (9th
Cir. 2003) (“It is a well-established canon of statutory
interpretation that the use of different words or terms
within a statute demonstrates that Congress intended
to convey a different meaning for those words.”). The
phrase “communication by radio” is used more
expansively: it conjures an image of all communications
using radio waves or a radio device. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(16)(E) (describing radio communication that “is
a two-way voice communication by radio transmitted
on a frequency “not exclusively allocated to broadcast
auxiliary services.”).
When read in context, the phrase “radio
communication” tends to refer more narrowly to
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broadcast radio technologies rather than to the radio
waves by which the communication is made. “Radio
communication” is typically surrounded by words that
evoke traditional radio technologies whenever it is used
in the Act. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561,
575 (1995) (“‘[A] word is known by the company it
keeps (the doctrine of noscitur a sociis). This rule we
rely upon to avoid ascribing to one word a meaning so
broad that it is inconsistent with its accompanying
words, thus giving ‘unintended breadth to the Acts of
Congress.’”). For example, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(ii),
inter alia, exempts from liability the interception of
“any radio communication which is transmitted … by a
station operating on an authorized frequency within the
bands allocated to the amateur, citizens band, or
general mobile radio services.” These are traditional
audio broadcasts that fit squarely within the ordinary
meaning of “radio communication.” The phrase “radio
communication” is used five times in the Wiretap Act.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16), 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(ii), 18
U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(v), 18 U.S.C. § 2511(5)(a)(i)(B), 18
U.S.C § 2520(c)(1).
Defining the term as a
predominantly auditory broadcast would not distort the
meaning of any of these provisions or otherwise lead to
incoherence or inconsistency.
On the other hand, the Wiretap Act uses
“communication by radio” to refer more broadly to any
communication transmitted by radio wave. See 18
U.S.C. § 2510(12) (defining “electronic communication”
to include any communication “transmitted in whole or
in part by … radio”); 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(b)(ii)
(prohibiting the use of a “device to intercept any oral
communication”
if
the
“device
transmits
communications by radio”); 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(b)
(authorizing FCC employees, in carrying out their
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official duties, “to intercept … [an] oral communication
transmitted by radio”). Congress’s decision to use both
of these phrases implies that it intended to distinguish
“radio communication” from “communications by
radio.” See McCarthy, 322 F.3d at 656. Ideally,
Congress would have supplied definitions to make the
distinction between these terms more apparent.
Nevertheless, by relying on their ordinary meaning and
evaluating how they are used in context, we conclude
that the former refers more narrowly to a
predominantly auditory broadcast while only the latter
encompasses other communications made using radio
waves.
The way the phrase “radio communication” is used
in 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(ii) is particularly relevant in
defining the term because that provision specifically
exempts from liability the interception of certain kinds
of radio communication. The provision is not directly at
issue here because—as Google acknowledges—Google’s
conduct is not encompassed by any of the
§ 2511(2)(g)(ii) exemptions, hence its reliance on
§ 2511(2)(g)(i). But it is instructive to understand the
types of communication exempted by § 2511(2)(g)(ii)
since the phrase “radio communication” is “known by
the company it keeps,” Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 575. The
exemptions include, inter alia, radio communications
transmitted “by any station for the use of the general
public,” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(ii)(I), “by a station
operating on an authorized frequency within the bands
allocated to the amateur, citizens band, or general
mobile radio services,” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(ii)(III),
and “by any marine or aeronautical communications
system,” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(ii)(IV). Other than the
fact that they all use the radio spectrum, these radio
communications have little in common with a home Wi-
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Fi network. Of course § 2511(2)(g)(i) exempts radio
communications that are “readily accessible to the
general public” even if they are not specifically set out
in § 2511(2)(g)(ii). But it would be odd for Congress to
take pains to identify particular kinds of radio
communications
that
should
be
exempt
in
§ 2511(2)(g)(ii) only to exempt broad swaths of
dissimilar communications, such as data transmitted
over a Wi-Fi network, under the auspices of
§ 2511(2)(g)(i). It is more sensible to read the general
exemption in § 2511(2)(g)(i)—insofar as it applies to
“radio communication” rather than other kinds of
“electronic communication”—in light of the specific
exemptions in § 2511(2)(g)(ii).
Relatedly, giving “radio communication” its
ordinary meaning as a predominantly auditory
broadcast also avoids producing absurd results that are
inconsistent with the statutory scheme. See Griffin v.
Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982)
(“[I]nterpretations of a statute which would produce
absurd results are to be avoided if alternative
interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose
are available.”); Ariz. State Bd. for Charter Schools v.
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 464 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2006)
(“[W]ell-accepted rules of statutory construction
caution us that ‘statutory interpretations which would
produce absurd results are to be avoided.’ When a
natural reading of the statutes leads to a rational,
common-sense result, an alteration of meaning is not
only unnecessary, but also extrajudicial.”). Under the
expansive definition of “radio communication” proposed
by Google, the protections afforded by the Wiretap Act
to many online communications would turn on whether
the recipient of those communications decided to secure
her wireless network. A “radio communication” is
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“readily accessible to the general public” and,
therefore, exempt from Wiretap Act liability if it is not
scrambled or encrypted.
18 U.S.C. § 2510(16).
Consider an email attachment containing sensitive
personal information sent from a secure Wi-Fi network
to a doctor, lawyer, accountant, priest, or spouse. A
company like Google that intercepts the contents of
that email from the encrypted home network has, quite
understandably, violated the Wiretap Act. But the
sender of the email is in no position to ensure that the
recipient—be it a doctor, lawyer, accountant, priest, or
spouse—has taken care to encrypt her own Wi-Fi
network. Google, or anyone else, could park outside of
the recipient’s home or office with a packet sniffer
while she downloaded the attachment and intercept its
contents because the sender’s “radio communication” is
“readily accessible to the general public” solely by
virtue of the fact that the recipient’s Wi-Fi network is
not encrypted. Surely Congress did not intend to
condone such an intrusive and unwarranted invasion of
privacy when it enacted the Wiretap Act “to protect
against the unauthorized interception of electronic
communications.” S. Rep. No. 99-541 (1986), at 1; see
also Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868,
875 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The legislative history of the
[Wiretap Act] suggests that Congress wanted to
protect electronic communications that are configured
to be private, such as email.”); In re Pharmatrak, Inc.
Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2003) (“The
paramount objective of the Wiretap Act is to protect
effectively the privacy of communications.”).
The definition of “readily accessible to the general
public” in § 2510(16) is limited to “radio
communication,” and does not encompass all “electronic
communication.” Congress’s decision to carve out
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“radio communication” for less protection than some
other types of “electronic communication” makes sense
if “radio communication” is given its ordinary meaning.
Traditional radio services can be easily and mistakenly
intercepted by hobbyists. See 132 Cong. Rec. S7987-04
(1986) (“In order to address radio hobbyists’ concerns,
we modified the original language of S. 1667 to clarify
that intercepting traditional radio services is not
unlawful.”). But “radio hobbyists” do not mistakenly
use packet sniffers to intercept payload data
transmitted on Wi-Fi networks.
Lending “radio
communication” a broad definition that encompasses
data transmitted on Wi-Fi networks would obliterate
Congress’s compromise and create absurd applications
of the exemption for intercepting unencrypted radio
communications.
For example, § 2511(2)(g)(ii)(II)
exempts from liability, inter alia, the act of
intercepting “any radio communication which is
transmitted … by any governmental, law enforcement
… or public safety communications system, including
police and fire, readily accessible to the general public.”
This provision reinforces the work performed by
§ 2511(2)(g)(i), which already exempts a “radio
communication” that is “readily accessible to the
general public.” Congress’s decision to ensure that
these communications were exempt makes sense if
“radio
communication”
encompasses
only
predominantly auditory broadcasts since these
transmissions can be picked up by widely available
police scanners. But if “radio communication” includes
data transmitted over Wi-Fi networks, then
§ 2511(2)(g)(ii)(II) also underscores that liability should
not attach to intercepting data from an unencrypted
Wi-Fi network operated by, say, a police department or
government agency. It seems doubtful that Congress
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wanted to emphasize that Google or anyone else could
park outside of a police station that carelessly failed to
secure its Wi-Fi network and intercept confidential
data with impunity.
Next, Google strenuously argues that the rest of
the Wiretap Act supports its position that “radio
communication” in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16) means “any
information transmitted using radio waves.” Google
leans heavily on § 2510(16)(D) and the accompanying
legislative history, which together suggest that cellular
telephone and paging systems are a form of “radio
communication.” If cell phone and paging systems are
a type of “radio communication,” Google argues, it must
be the case that Congress intended that the phrase
include Wi-Fi networks and the rest of the radio
spectrum because these technologies differ from
paradigmatic radio communications like AM/FM, CB,
and shortwave transmissions.
But cell phone
communications were not dissimilar from CB,
shortwave, or other two-way forms of traditional radio
broadcasts when § 2510(16)(D) was added to the
Wiretap Act in 1986 as part of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100
Stat. 1848. When Congress enacted § 2510(16)(D), cell
phones were still called “cellular radiotelephones.” See
H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, at 20 (1986). As with other audio
broadcasts, cellular conversations were often
inadvertently picked up by radio hobbyists “scanning
radio frequencies in order to receive public
communications.” S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 3560 (1986);
see also H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, at 20 (“Cellular
telephone calls can be intercepted by either
sophisticated scanners designed for that purpose, or by
regular radio scanners modified to intercept cellular
calls”). The fact that technology has evolved and
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cellular communications are no longer as similar to CB
broadcasts as they once were does not require us to
read
“radio
communication”
to
include
all
communications made using radio waves. Rather, the
historical context surrounding Congress’s protection of
cellular conversations as a form of a “radio
communication” is consistent with the commonsense
definition of the term because, at the time of the
enactment of the definition in 1986, cellular
conversations could have reasonably been construed as
analogous to a form of two-way radio.6 Assuming,
arguendo, that the phrase “radio communication”
covers cell phone transmissions as they existed in 1986
does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that it also
encompasses transmissions that are plainly not
predominantly auditory broadcasts, such as payload
data transmitted over a Wi-Fi network.
Google also looks beyond the Wiretap Act in an
effort to fit its expansive definition of “radio
communication” into the statutory scheme. It points
6

With modern advances in cellular technology, it is less clear
how cell phones would fit within the statutory scheme today. We
need not resolve this question here.
Whether cell phone
transmissions are an example of a “radio communication” is
relevant to defining the phrase, but it is not a precursor to
observing that a “radio communication” is ordinarily a
predominantly auditory broadcast or to holding that payload data
transmitted over a Wi-Fi network is not a “radio communication.”
We previously held that cell phone communications are “wire
communications” for purposes of the Wiretap Act, but we did not
address whether they are an example of a “radio communication.”
See In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing Roving Interception of
Oral Commc'ns, 349 F.3d 1132, 1138 n.12 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Despite
the apparent wireless nature of cellular phones, communications
using cellular phones are considered wire communications under
the statute, because cellular telephones use wire and cable
connections when connecting calls.”).
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out that the Communications Act expressly defines the
phrases “radio communication” and “communication by
radio” broadly to include “the transmission by radio of
writing, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds of all
kinds.” 47 U.S.C. § 153(40). But when Congress
wanted
to
borrow
a
definition
from
the
Communications Act to apply to the Wiretap Act, it
expressly said so. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (giving the
phrase “communication common carrier” the meaning
that it has “in section 3 of the Communications Act”).
Here, Congress refrained from incorporating the
definition of “radio communication” used in the
Communications Act. And, as previously discussed, the
Wiretap Act uses the phrases “radio communication”
and “communication by radio” differently, indicating
that Congress did not intend to import the
Communications Act’s definition, which treats them as
synonyms. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(40). Furthermore, the
Communication
Act’s
definition
of
“radio
communication”
encompasses
technologies
like
television by including “the transmission by radio of …
pictures … of all kinds,” 47 U.S.C. § 153(40), while the
Wiretap Act sometimes distinguishes them. See, e.g.,
18 U.S.C. § 2520(c)(1) (providing specified penalties
when the “violation of this chapter is the private
viewing of a private satellite video communication that
is not scrambled or encrypted or if the communication
is a radio communication that is transmitted on
[frequencies specified by regulation]”).
Separate
references to television-related communications would
be redundant when paired with the phrase “radio
communication” if we were to assume that the
Communication Act’s definition applied to the Wiretap
Act. Importantly, the presumption that a definition set
out in one part of the code is intended to govern
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another is hardly unyielding in the face of such
contradictory evidence. See, e.g., General Dynamics
Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 595 (2004)
(holding that the word “age” carries a different
meaning in different sections of the ADEA); Robinson
v. Shell Oil, 519 U.S. 337, 343 (1997) (holding that the
term “employees” carries a different meaning in
different sections of Title VII).
Google also leans heavily on a series of
amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16) to argue that
Congress impliedly gave the phrase “radio
communication” a meaning other than the ordinary one
that we adopt here. In 1990, Senator Patrick Leahy
commissioned a task force to study the effect of new
technologies, including the precursors to wireless
networking, on the statutory scheme created in 1986 by
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. See S.
Hrg. 103-1022, at 179 (1994). In its report, the task
force indicated it was concerned that communications
by “‘wireless modems’ which can transmit data
between computers … will not be protected unless the
user goes to the expense of full data encryption.” Id. at
183. The section of the report on “Wireless Data
Communications” concluded that “[t]he task force
recommends appropriate amendments to legally
protect digital communications of this type from
unauthorized interception.” Id. In short, the task force
was of the opinion that the version of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(16) enacted in 1986 did not adequately protect
unencrypted “wireless data communications.” The task
force must have implicitly decided that “wireless data
communications” were a “radio communication”
because otherwise it would not have been concerned
with § 2510(16), which only applies to “radio
communication.” See id.
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In 1994, Congress amended § 2510(16) to add a new
category of communication—which it called an
“electronic communication”—that it deemed to be a
“radio communication” that was not “readily accessible
to the general public.” In relevant part, the statute
provided that “‘readily accessible to the general public’
means, with respect to a radio communication, that
such communication is not … (F) an electronic
communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16) (1994). Google
claims that Congress added § 2510(16)(F) in 1994 in
order to protect from interception new technologies
that transmitted data using radio frequencies, including
the contemporary versions of wireless networks.
There is some support for this proposition in the
congressional record. See H.R. Rep. No. 103-827, at 18
(1994) (explaining that the bill “[e]xtends privacy
protections of the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act to cordless phones and certain data
communications transmitted by radio”).
The significance of all of this is that Congress
repealed 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16)(F) in 1996. Google
attempts to draw a series of inferences from the 1994
and 1996 amendments: The 1994 Congress thought
that data transmissions across the wireless networks of
the day were a type of “radio communication.”
Otherwise, Congress would not have needed to amend
§ 2510(16) in order to shield them from interception
given that the provision only applies to “radio
communication.” By deleting § 2510(16)(F), the 1996
Congress removed the sole protection for unencrypted
data transmissions over wireless networks by
returning § 2510(16) to its pre-amendment form. From
Google’s perspective, the upshot of this historical
narrative is that payload data transmitted over an
unencrypted Wi-Fi network is a “radio communication”
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that is “readily accessible to the general public” before
the 1994 amendment and, crucially, after the 1996
repeal.
This evidence of congressional action and inaction
is far more equivocal than Google acknowledges. First,
the task force’s report does not control what the phrase
“radio communication” meant to Congress when it
enacted § 2510(16) in 1986. The task force’s report
suggests that it thought that the “wireless data
communication” technology that existed in 1991
entailed “radio communication” as the phrase is used in
§ 2510(16). But the task force’s opinion on questions of
statutory interpretation has no independent authority;
it is not charged with divining congressional intent.
The task force’s recommendation informs us that in
1991 a group of fifteen individuals thought that early
versions of wireless networks involved “radio
communication” under the statute. Their opinion is not
indicative of what Congress intended when it included
the phrase in the Wiretap Act. It may be considered
evidence of the phrase’s ordinary meaning. But it does
not outweigh the more substantial evidence, discussed
at length above, indicating that the ordinary meaning of
“radio communication” excludes data transmitted over
a Wi-Fi network.
Second, Congress’s decision to add § 2510(16)(F) in
1994 does not prove that it thought data transmitted
over a Wi-Fi network constituted a “radio
communication.” The 1994 Congress was certainly
concerned about ensuring that “certain data
communications transmitted by radio” were protected
from interception. But that does not necessarily mean
that it was of the view that such communications were
a “radio communication” under § 2510(16). Congress
might have been forestalling the possibility that
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evolving technologies would be construed as radio
communications, contrary to the ordinary meaning of
the phrase.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, there is no
reliable indication of what the 1996 Congress intended
to accomplish by repealing § 2510(16)(F). Google mines
the 1991 task force report and the 1994 congressional
record, but it cannot close the loop on its argument
because the 1996 Congress did not leave behind the
snippets of enactment history that are essential to
Google’s narrative. Consider two possible rationales
for the 1996 repeal of § 2510(16)(F): first, Congress
might have deleted the provision because it found it
redundant. That is, Congress might have thought that
data transmitted over a radio frequency was not a
“radio communication,” which would render the
additional protection for such communications offered
by § 2510(16)(F) unnecessary.
Alternatively, Congress might have (correctly)
determined that § 2510(16)(F) made the statute
incoherent.
Recall that the short-lived provision
provided that “‘readily accessible to the general public’
means, with respect to a radio communication, that
such communication is not … (F) an electronic
communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16)(F) (1994). The
phrase “electronic communication” has been broadly
defined since the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act of 1986. In 1994, when § 2510(16)(F) was added,
the Wiretap Act provided—as it still does today—that
“‘electronic communication’ means any transfer of
signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or
intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in
part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic
or photooptical system that affects interstate
commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12). As Google stresses
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in its briefs, and the statute plainly states, “radio
communication”
is
a
subset
of
“electronic
communication.” Yet § 2510(16)(F) conveyed that a
“radio communication” was not “readily accessible to
the general public” if it was an “electronic
communication,” which incoherently implies that the
latter was a subset of the former. The repeal of
§ 2510(16)(F) could, therefore, have been a
housekeeping matter designed to resolve this internal
tension without affecting the protection afforded
“electronic communications, including data” that the
1994 Congress sought to protect.
Neither of these entirely plausible explanations for
the amendment and repeal are consistent with Google’s
assumption that the pre-1994 conception of “radio
communication” included data transmitted over a Wi-Fi
network and the 1996 repeal of § 2510(16)(F) sought to
restore that conception. The point is that we do not
know why the 1996 Congress deleted § 2510(16)(F).
We choose to rely on the ordinary meaning of the
phrase “radio communication” rather than follow a trail
of enactment history that culminates in silence and
then speculate as to Congress’s unexpressed intent.
Finally, Google’s fall back position is that the rule
of lenity dictates that we accept its proposed definition
of “radio communication.” Although this is a civil suit,
the Wiretap Act also carries criminal penalties so
Google’s reliance on the rule of lenity is not unfounded.
See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004)
(“Because we must interpret the statute consistently,
whether we encounter its application in a criminal or
noncriminal context, the rule of lenity applies.”). But
we do not resort to the rule of lenity every time a
difficult question of statutory interpretation arises.
Rather, “the rule of lenity only applies if, after
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considering text, structure, history, and purpose, there
remains a ‘grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the
statute.’” Barber v. Thomas, 130 S. Ct. 2499, 2508
(2010) (citations omitted); see also Smith v. United
States, 508 U.S. 223, 239 (1993) (“The mere possibility
of articulating a narrower construction [ ] does not
make the rule of lenity applicable. Instead, that
venerable rule is reserved for cases where, ‘[a]fter
“seizing every thing from which aid can be derived,”’
the Court is ‘left with an ambiguous statute.’”)
(citations omitted). Here, the traditional tools of
statutory interpretation are sufficient. The ordinary
meaning of “radio communication” is consistent with
the structure of the Act and avoids absurd results
without running afoul of any clearly expressed
congressional intent. We need not resort to the rule of
lenity where, as here, the ambiguity can be fairly
resolved.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we agree with the
district court that data transmitted over a Wi-Fi
network is not a “radio communication” under 18
U.S.C. § 2510(16).
AFFIRMED.
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OPINION
BYBEE, Circuit Judge:
In the course of capturing its Street View
photographs, Google collected data from unencrypted
Wi-Fi networks.
Google publicly apologized, but
plaintiffs brought suit under federal and state law,
including the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511. Google
argues that its data collection did not violate the Act
because data transmitted over a Wi-Fi network is an
“electronic communication” that is “readily accessible
to the general public” and exempt under the Act. 18
U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i). The district court rejected
Google’s argument. In re Google Inc. St. View Elec.
Commc’n Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1073–84 (N.D.
Cal. 2011). We affirm.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. Facts and History
Google launched its Street View feature in the
United States in 2007 to complement its Google Maps
service by providing users with panoramic, street-level
photographs. Street View photographs are captured
by cameras mounted on vehicles owned by Google that
drive on public roads and photograph their
surroundings. Between 2007 and 2010, Google also
* The Honorable William H. Stafford, Jr., Senior District
Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Florida, sitting by designation.
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equipped its Street View cars with Wi-Fi antennas and
software that collected data transmitted by Wi-Fi
networks in nearby homes and businesses.
The
equipment attached to Google’s Street View cars
recorded basic information about these Wi-Fi
networks, including the network’s name (SSID), the
unique number assigned to the router transmitting the
wireless signal (MAC address), the signal strength, and
whether the network was encrypted. Gathering this
basic data about the Wi-Fi networks used in homes and
businesses enables companies such as Google to provide
enhanced “location-based” services, such as those that
allow mobile phone users to find nearby restaurants
and attractions or receive driving directions.
But the antennas and software installed in Google’s
Street View cars collected more than just the basic
identifying information transmitted by Wi-Fi networks.
They also gathered and stored “payload data” that was
sent and received over unencrypted Wi-Fi connections
at the moment that a Street View car was driving by.1
Payload data includes everything transmitted by a
device connected to a Wi-Fi network, such as personal
emails, usernames, passwords, videos, and documents.
Google acknowledged in May 2010 that its Street
View vehicles had been collecting fragments of payload
data from unencrypted Wi-Fi networks. The company
publicly apologized, grounded its vehicles, and
rendered inaccessible the personal data that had been
acquired. In total, Google’s Street View cars collected
about 600 gigabytes of data transmitted over Wi-Fi
networks in more than 30 countries.
1

Google may have also used its software to capture
encrypted data, but the plaintiffs have conceded that their
wireless networks were unencrypted.
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Several putative class-action lawsuits were filed
shortly after Google’s announcement, and, in August
2010, the cases were transferred by the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation to the Northern District of
California. In November, 2010, Plaintiffs-Appellees
(collectively “Joffe”) filed a consolidated complaint,
asserting claims against Google under the federal
Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511; California Business and
Professional Code § 17200; and various state wiretap
statutes. Joffe seeks to represent a class comprised of
all persons whose electronic communications were
intercepted by Google Street View vehicles since May
25, 2007.
Google moved to dismiss Joffe’s consolidated
complaint. The district court declined to grant Google’s
motion to dismiss Joffe’s federal Wiretap Act claims.2
In re Google Inc. St. View Elec. Commc’n Litig., 794 F.
Supp. 2d at 1084. On Google’s request, the court
certified its ruling for interlocutory appeal under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b) because the district court resolved a
novel question of statutory interpretation. We granted
Google’s petition, and we have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b).
B. District Court’s Decision
Google maintained before the district court that it
should have dismissed Joffe’s Wiretap Act claims
because data transmitted over unencrypted Wi-Fi
networks falls under the statutory exemption that
makes
it
lawful
to
intercept
“electronic
communications” that are “readily accessible to the
2

The district court granted Google’s motion to dismiss Joffe’s
claims under California law and other state wiretap statutes. In re
Google Inc. St. View Elec. Commc’n Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d at
1085–86. These claims are not at issue here.
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general public.” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i). The question
was whether payload data transmitted on an
unencrypted Wi-Fi network is “readily accessible to the
general public,” such that the § 2511(2)(g)(i) exemption
applies to Google’s conduct.
To answer this question, the district court first
looked to the definitions supplied by the Act. In re
Google Inc. St. View Elec. Commc’n Litig., 794 F. Supp.
2d at 1075–76. The statute provides in relevant part
that “‘readily accessible to the general public’ means,
with respect to a radio communication, that such
communication is not … (A) scrambled or encrypted.”
18 U.S.C. § 2510(16).
An unencrypted radio
communication is, therefore, “readily accessible to the
general public.” In short, intercepting an unencrypted
radio communication does not give rise to liability
under the Wiretap Act because of the combination of
the § 2511(2)(g)(i) exemption and the § 2510(16)
definition.
The district court then considered whether data
transmitted over a Wi-Fi network is a “radio
communication” because the phrase is not defined by
the Act. In re Google Inc. St. View Elec. Commc’n
Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d at 1076–81. The court reasoned
that “radio communication” encompasses only
“traditional radio services,” and not other technologies
that also transmit data using radio waves, such as
cellular phones and Wi-Fi networks.3 Id. at 1079–83.
Since Wi-Fi networks are not a “radio communication,”
the definition of “readily accessible to the general
public” provided by § 2510(16) does not apply because
3

It is less clear whether the district court’s definition also
excludes television broadcasts. Joffe argued at oral argument that
television broadcasts are “traditional radio services.”

36a
the definition is expressly limited to electronic
communications that are radio communications.
Finally, the court addressed whether data
transmitted over unencrypted Wi-Fi networks is
nevertheless an “electronic communication” that is
“readily accessible to the general public” under
§ 2511(2)(g)(i). Id. at 1082–84. Although the court
determined that Wi-Fi networks do not involve a “radio
communication” under § 2510(16) and are therefore not
“readily accessible to the general public” by virtue of
the definition of the phrase, it still had to resolve
whether they are “readily accessible to the general
public” as the phrase is ordinarily understood because
the statute does not define the phrase as it applies to an
“electronic communication” that is not a “radio
communication.” The court determined that data
transmitted over an unencrypted Wi-Fi network is not
“readily accessible to the general public.” Id. at 1082–
83. As a result, the § 2511(2)(g)(i) exemption does not
apply to Google’s conduct. The court accordingly
declined to grant Google’s motion to dismiss Joffe’s
Wiretap Act claims. Id. at 1084.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE WIRETAP ACT
The Wiretap Act imposes liability on a person who
“intentionally intercepts … any wire, oral, or electronic
communication,” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a), subject to a
number of exemptions. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)–(h).
There are two exemptions that are relevant to our
purposes. First, the Wiretap Act exempts intercepting
“an electronic communication made through an
electronic communication system” if the system is
configured so that it is “readily accessible to the
general public.” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i). “Electronic
communication” includes communication by radio, 18
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U.S.C. § 2510(12), and “‘readily accessible to the
general public’ means, with respect to a radio
communication” that the communication is “not …
scrambled or encrypted,” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16)(A).
Second, the Act exempts intercepting “radio
communication” by “any station for the use of the
general
public;”
by
certain
governmental
communication systems “readily accessible to the
general public,” including police, fire, and civil defense
agencies; by a station operating on an authorized
frequency for “amateur, citizens band, or general
mobile radio services;” or by a marine or aeronautical
communications system. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(ii)(I)–
(IV).
Google only argues, as it did before the district
court, that it is exempt from liability under the Act
because data transmitted over a Wi-Fi network is an
“electronic communication … readily accessible to the
general public” under § 2511(2)(g)(i). It concedes that it
does not qualify for any of the exemptions for specific
types of “radio communication” under § 2511(2)(g)(ii).
Joffe, however, argues that if data transmitted over a
Wi-Fi network is not exempt as a “radio
communication” under § 2511(2)(g)(ii), it cannot be
exempt as a radio communication under the broader
exemption
for
“electronic
communication”
in
§ 2511(2)(g)(i). This argument has some force, and we
wish to address it before we consider Google’s claims.
Joffe contends that the definition of “readily
accessible to the general public” in § 2510(16) does not
apply to the § 2511(2)(g)(i) exemption. Instead, Joffe
argues, the § 2510(16) definition applies exclusively to
§ 2511(2)(g)(ii)(II),
which
exempts
specifically
enumerated types of “radio communication” when they
are “readily accessible to the general public.” We

38a
ultimately reject Joffe’s alternative reading of the
statute, although—as we will explain—we find
§ 2511(2)(g)(ii) useful as a lexigraphical aid to
understanding the phrase “radio communication.”
As noted, § 2510(16) defines “readily accessible to
the general public” solely with respect to a “radio
communication,” and not with respect to other types of
“electronic communication.” Although § 2511(2)(g)(i)
does not use the words “radio communication,” the
statute nevertheless directs us to apply the § 2510(16)
definition to the § 2511(2)(g)(i) exemption. First, “radio
communication”
is
a
subset
of
“electronic
communication.” See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (providing
that, subject to certain exceptions, “‘electronic
communication’ means any transfer of signs, signals,
writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any
nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio,
electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical
system”) (emphasis added). Second, the statute directs
us to apply § 2510(16) to the entire chapter. The
definitions in 18 U.S.C. § 2510 are prefaced with the
phrase, “As used in this chapter.” We cannot disregard
this command by holding that the definition of “‘readily
accessible to the general public’ [ ] with respect to a
radio communication” applies to § 2511(2)(g)(ii), but not
§ 2511(2)(g)(i).
Admittedly, following the plain language of the
statute creates some tension with § 2511(2)(g)(ii)(II),
which provides an exemption for intercepting “any
radio communication which is transmitted … by any
governmental, law enforcement, civil defense, private
land mobile, or public communications system,
including police and fire, readily accessible to the
general public.” Under our reading of the statute—
which is the same reading adopted by the district court,

39a
Google, and Joffe in his lead argument—§ 2511(2)(g)(i)
exempts all electronic communications (including radio
communications) that are “readily accessible to the
general public” as the phrase is defined in § 2510(16).
This reading likely renders § 2511(2)(g)(ii)(II)
superfluous.
As discussed, that section exempts
specific kinds of radio communications that are “readily
accessible to the general public,” such as those
transmitted by a law enforcement communications
system. But this exemption is unnecessary when
§ 2511(2)(g)(i)
already
exempts
all
radio
communications that are “readily accessible to the
general public.”
Although
our
reading
may
render
§ 2511(2)(g)(ii)(II) superfluous or at least redundant, we
understand that Congress “sometimes drafts provisions
that appear duplicative of others—simply in Macbeth’s
words, ‘to make assurance double sure.’ That is,
Congress means to clarify what might be doubtful—
that the mentioned item is covered.” Shook v. D.C.
Fin. Responsibility & Mgmt. Assistance Auth., 132
F.3d 775, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1998). This interpretation is
especially plausible given that Congress was concerned
that radio hobbyists not face liability for intercepting
readily accessible broadcasts, such as those covered by
§ 2511(2)(g)(ii)(II), which can be picked up by a police
scanner. See 132 Cong. Rec. S7987-04 (1986) (“In order
to address radio hobbyists’ concerns, we modified the
original language of S. 1667 to clarify that intercepting
traditional radio services is not unlawful.”).
In short, we agree with Google that the definition
of “readily accessible to the general public” in
§ 2510(16) applies to the § 2511(2)(g)(i) exemption when
the communication in question is a “radio
communication.” With that understanding, we now
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turn to whether data transmitted over a Wi-Fi network
is a “radio communication” exempt from the Wiretap
Act as an “electronic communication” under
§ 2511(2)(g)(i).
III. ANALYSIS
In support of its position that it is exempt under
§ 2511(2)(g)(i), Google offers two arguments. First, it
contends that data transmitted over a Wi-Fi network is
an electronic “radio communication” and that the Act
exempts such communications by defining them as
“readily accessible to the general public,” 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511(2)(g)(i), so long as “such communication is not …
scrambled or encrypted,” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16)(A).
Second, Google contends that even if data transmitted
over an unencrypted Wi-Fi network is not a “radio
communication,” it is still an “electronic communication
… readily accessible to the general public.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511(2)(g)(i).
We reject both claims.4 We hold that the phrase
“radio communication” in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16) excludes
payload data transmitted over a Wi-Fi network. As a
consequence, the definition of “readily accessible to the
general public [ ] with respect to a radio
communication” set forth in § 2510(16) does not apply to
the exemption for an “electronic communication” that is
4

This case raises a question of statutory interpretation,
which we review de novo. Phoenix Mem’l Hosp. v. Sebelius, 622
F.3d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 2010). We begin by “determin[ing]
whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous
meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.”
Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002). We must
assume that “the ordinary meaning of that language accurately
expresses the legislative purpose [of Congress].” Park ’N Fly,
Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985).
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“readily accessible to the general public” under 18
U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i). We further hold that payload
data transmitted over an unencrypted Wi-Fi network is
not “readily accessible to the general public” under the
ordinary meaning of the phrase as it is used in
§ 2511(2)(g)(i).
A. Data Transmitted over a Wi-Fi Network Is Not
a“Radio Communication” under the Wiretap Act.
We turn first to the question of whether data
transmitted over a Wi-Fi network is a “radio
communication” as that term is used in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(16). If data transmitted over a Wi-Fi network is
a radio communication, then any radio communication
that is not scrambled or encrypted is considered
“readily accessible to the general public,” and is exempt
from liability under the Wiretap Act. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511(2)(g)(i).
1.

The
ordinary
meaning
of
“radio
communication” does not include data
transmitted over a Wi-Fi network

The Wiretap Act does not define the phrase “radio
communication” so we must give the term its ordinary
meaning. See Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464,
2471 (2010) (“When terms used in a statute are
undefined, we give them their ordinary meaning.”);
United States v. Daas, 198 F.3d 1167, 1174 (9th Cir.
1999) (“If the statute uses a term which it does not
define, the court gives that term its ordinary
meaning.”).
According to Google, radio communication “refers
to any information transmitted using radio waves, i.e.,
the radio frequency portion of the electromagnetic
spectrum.” Appellant’s Br. at 28. The radio frequency
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portion of the spectrum is “the part of the spectrum
where electromagnetic waves have frequencies in the
range of about 3 kilohertz to 300 gigahertz.” Id. at 27.
Google’s technical definition does not conform with
the common understanding held contemporaneous with
the enacting Congress. See United States v. Iverson,
162 F.3d 1015, 1022 (9th Cir. 1998) (“When a statute
does not define a term, we generally interpret that
term by employing the ordinary, contemporary, and
common meaning of the words that Congress used”)
(emphasis added). The radio frequency portion of the
electromagnetic spectrum covers not only Wi-Fi
transmissions, but also television broadcasts, Bluetooth
devices, cordless and cellular phones, garage door
openers, avalanche beacons, and wildlife tracking
collars. See Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, Encyclopedia –
FM Broadcast Station Classes and Service Countours,
available
at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/
publications/2003-allochrt.pdf (last visited Aug. 13,
2013).
One would not ordinarily consider, say,
television a form of “radio communication.” Not
surprisingly, Congress has not typically assumed that
the term “radio” encompasses the term “television.”
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (imposing liability for “[f]raud
by wire, radio, or television”) (emphasis added); 18
U.S.C. § 2101 (imposing liability for inciting a riot by
means of “mail, telegraph, radio, or television”)
(emphasis added); 7 U.S.C. § 2156 (defining an
“instrumentality of interstate commerce” as “any
written, wire, radio, television or other form of
communication); see also FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm.
for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 815 (1978) (noting that “radio
and television stations are given different weight,”
under the regulations at issue, and describing
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regulations governing “a radio or television broadcast
station”) (emphasis added).
The Wiretap Act itself does not assume that the
phrase
“radio
communication”
encompasses
technologies like satellite television that are outside the
scope of the phrase as it is ordinarily defined. For
example, the statute’s damages provision sets out
specified penalties when the “violation of this chapter is
the private viewing of a private satellite video
communication that is not scrambled or encrypted or if
the communication is a radio communication that is
transmitted on [frequencies specified by regulation].”
18 U.S.C. § 2520(c)(1) (emphasis added). Congress
described separately the act of “viewing [ ] a private
satellite video communication” even though such
communication is transmitted on a radio frequency and
would fall within Google’s proposed definition of “radio
communication.”
Taken together, these disparate
provisions offer evidence that Congress does not use
“radio” or “radio communication” to reference all of the
myriad forms of communication that use the radio
spectrum. Rather, it uses “radio” to refer to traditional
radio technologies, and then separately describes other
modes of communication that are not ordinarily thought
of as radio, but that nevertheless use the radio
spectrum.
Google’s proposed definition is in tension with how
Congress—and virtually everyone else—uses the
phrase. In common parlance, watching a television
show does not entail “radio communication.” Nor does
sending an email or viewing a bank statement while
connected to a Wi-Fi network. There is no indication
that the Wiretap Act carries a buried implication that
the phrase ought to be given a broader definition than
the one that is commonly understood. See Mohamad v.
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Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1707 (2012)
(favoring a definition that matches “how we use the
word in everyday parlance” and observing that
“Congress remains free, as always, to give the word a
broader or different meaning. But before we will
assume it has done so, there must be some indication
Congress intended such a result”).
Importantly, Congress provided definitions for
many other similar terms in the Wiretap Act, but
refrained from providing a technical definition of “radio
communication” that would have altered the notion that
it should carry its common, ordinary meaning. See, e.g.,
18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (defining “wire communication”); 18
U.S.C.
§
2510(12)
(defining
“electronic
communication”); 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (defining
“electronic communication service”); 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(17) (defining “electronic storage”). As Google
writes in its brief, “[t]he fact that the Wiretap Act
provides specialized definitions for certain compound
terms—but not for ‘radio communication’—is powerful
evidence that the undefined term was not similarly
intended [to] be defined in a specialized or narrow way”
but rather “according to its ordinary meaning.”
Appellant’s Br. at 29. We agree and, accordingly, we
reject Google’s proposed definition of “radio
communication” in favor of one that better reflects the
phrase’s ordinary meaning.
2.

A “radio communication” is a predominantly
auditory broadcast, which excludes payload
data transmitted over Wi-Fi networks

There are two telltale indicia of a “radio
communication.” A radio communication is commonly
understood to be (1) predominantly auditory, and (2)
broadcast. Therefore, television—whether connected

45a
via an indoor antenna or a satellite dish—is not radio,
by virtue of its visual component. A land line phone
does not broadcast, and, for that reason, is not radio.
On the other hand, AM/FM, Citizens Band (CB),
‘walkie-talkie,’ and shortwave transmissions are
predominantly auditory, are broadcast, and are, not
coincidentally, typically referred to as “radio” in
everyday parlance. Thus, we conclude that “radio
communication” should carry its ordinary meaning: a
predominantly auditory broadcast.5
The payload data transmitted over unencrypted
Wi-Fi networks that was captured by Google included
emails, usernames, passwords, images, and documents
that cannot be classified as predominantly auditory.
They therefore fall outside of the definition of a “radio
communication” as the phrase is used in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(16).

5

We need not reach the question of what exactly constitutes
a “broadcast” because the Wi-Fi transmissions in question were
not predominantly auditory. Whether cell phone calls—which are
projected wirelessly over great distances—are broadcast would
similarly be a close question.
We also need not fully consider the extent to which nonauditory transmissions may be included in a broadcast before that
broadcast is no longer a radio broadcast. Modern FM radio
stations, for example, commonly transmit small amounts of data
denoting the artist and title of the song. But because such data is
ancillary to the audio transmission, they likely do not remove the
transmissions from the domain of a “radio communication” under
the Act.
And, finally, we do not address how to classify a traditional
radio broadcast delivered to a web-enabled device connected to a
Wi-Fi network, such as a radio station streamed over the internet.
Here, Google’s collection efforts were not limited to auditory
transmissions.
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3.

Defining “radio communication” to include only
predominantly
auditory
broadcasts
is
consistent with the rest of the Wiretap Act

Crucially, defining “radio communication” as a
predominantly auditory broadcast yields a coherent
and consistent Wiretap Act. Google’s overly broad
definition does not. See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,
486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (“In ascertaining the plain
meaning of the statute, the court must look to the
particular statutory language at issue, as well as the
language and design of the statute as a whole.”)
Throughout the Wiretap Act, Congress used the
phrase “radio communication”—which is at issue
here—and the similar phrase “communication by
radio.” Even within the very provision that we are
construing—18 U.S.C. § 2510(16)—Congress used both
phrases. We must ascribe to each phrase its own
meaning. See SEC v. McCarthy, 322 F.3d 650, 656 (9th
Cir. 2003) (“It is a well-established canon of statutory
interpretation that the use of different words or terms
within a statute demonstrates that Congress intended
to convey a different meaning for those words.”). The
phrase “communication by radio” is used more
expansively: it conjures an image of all communications
using radio waves or a radio device. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(16)(E) (describing radio communication that “is
a two-way voice communication by radio transmitted
on a frequency “not exclusively allocated to broadcast
auxiliary services.”).
When read in context, the phrase “radio
communication” tends to refer more narrowly to
broadcast radio technologies rather than to the radio
waves by which the communication is made. “Radio
communication” is typically surrounded by words that
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evoke traditional radio technologies whenever it is used
in the Act. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561,
575 (1995) (“”[A] word is known by the company it
keeps (the doctrine of noscitur a sociis). This rule we
rely upon to avoid ascribing to one word a meaning so
broad that it is inconsistent with its accompanying
words, thus giving ‘unintended breadth to the Acts of
Congress.’”). For example, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(ii),
inter alia, exempts from liability the interception of
“any radio communication which is transmitted … by a
station operating on an authorized frequency within the
bands allocated to the amateur, citizens band, or
general mobile radio services.” These are traditional
audio broadcasts that fit squarely within the ordinary
meaning of “radio communication.” The phrase “radio
communication” is used five times in the Wiretap Act.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16), 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(ii), 18
U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(v), 18 U.S.C. § 2511(5)(a)(i)(B), 18
U.S.C. § 2520(c)(1).
Defining the term as a
predominantly auditory broadcast would not distort the
meaning of any of these provisions or otherwise lead to
incoherence or inconsistency.
On the other hand, the Wiretap Act uses
“communication by radio” to refer more broadly to any
communication transmitted by radio wave. See 18
U.S.C. § 2510(12) (defining “electronic communication”
to include any communication “transmitted in whole or
in part by … radio”); 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(b)(ii)
(prohibiting the use of a “device to intercept any oral
communication”
if
the
“device
transmits
communications by radio”); 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(b)
(authorizing FCC employees, in carrying out their
official duties, “to intercept … [an] oral communication
transmitted by radio”). Congress’s decision to use both
of these phrases implies that it intended to distinguish
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“radio communication” from “communications by radio.”
See McCarthy, 322 F.3d at 656. Ideally, Congress would
have supplied definitions to make the distinction
between these terms more apparent. Nevertheless, by
relying on their ordinary meaning and evaluating how
they are used in context, we conclude that the former
refers more narrowly to a predominantly auditory
broadcast while only the latter encompasses other
communications made using radio waves.
The way the phrase “radio communication” is used
in 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(ii) is particularly relevant in
defining the term because that provision specifically
exempts from liability the interception of certain kinds
of radio communication. The provision is not directly at
issue here because—as Google acknowledges—Google’s
conduct is not encompassed by any of the
§ 2511(2)(g)(ii) exemptions, hence its reliance on
§ 2511(2)(g)(i). But it is instructive to understand the
types of communication exempted by § 2511(2)(g)(ii)
since the phrase “radio communication” is “known by
the company it keeps,” Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 575. The
exemptions include, inter alia, radio communications
transmitted “by any station for the use of the general
public,” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(ii)(I), “by a station
operating on an authorized frequency within the bands
allocated to the amateur, citizens band, or general
mobile radio services,” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(ii)(III),
and “by any marine or aeronautical communications
system,” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(ii)(IV). Other than the
fact that they all use the radio spectrum, these radio
communications have little in common with a home WiFi network. Of course § 2511(2)(g)(i) exempts radio
communications that are “readily accessible to the
general public” even if they are not specifically set out
in § 2511(2)(g)(ii). But it would be odd for Congress to
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take pains to identify particular kinds of radio
communications
that
should
be
exempt
in
§ 2511(2)(g)(ii) only to exempt broad swaths of
dissimilar communications, such as data transmitted
over a Wi-Fi network, under the auspices of
§ 2511(2)(g)(i). It is more sensible to read the general
exemption in § 2511(2)(g)(i)—insofar as it applies to
“radio communication” rather than other kinds of
“electronic communication”—in light of the specific
exemptions in § 2511(2)(g)(ii).
Relatedly, giving “radio communication” its
ordinary meaning as a predominantly auditory
broadcast also avoids producing absurd results that are
inconsistent with the statutory scheme. See Griffin v.
Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982)
(“[I]nterpretations of a statute which would produce
absurd results are to be avoided if alternative
interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose
are available.”); Ariz. State Bd. for Charter Schools v.
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 464 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2006)
(“[W]ell-accepted rules of statutory construction
caution us that ‘statutory interpretations which would
produce absurd results are to be avoided.’ When a
natural reading of the statutes leads to a rational,
common-sense result, an alteration of meaning is not
only unnecessary, but also extrajudicial.”). Under the
expansive definition of “radio communication” proposed
by Google, the protections afforded by the Wiretap Act
to many online communications would turn on whether
the recipient of those communications decided to secure
her wireless network. A “radio communication” is
“readily accessible to the general public” and,
therefore, exempt from Wiretap Act liability if it is not
scrambled or encrypted.
18 U.S.C. § 2510(16).
Consider an email attachment containing sensitive
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personal information sent from a secure Wi-Fi network
to a doctor, lawyer, accountant, priest, or spouse. A
company like Google that intercepts the contents of
that email from the encrypted home network has, quite
understandably, violated the Wiretap Act. But the
sender of the email is in no position to ensure that the
recipient—be it a doctor, lawyer, accountant, priest, or
spouse—has taken care to encrypt her own Wi-Fi
network. Google, or anyone else, could park outside of
the recipient’s home or office with a packet sniffer
while she downloaded the attachment and intercept its
contents because the sender’s “radio communication” is
“readily accessible to the general public” solely by
virtue of the fact that the recipient’s Wi-Fi network is
not encrypted. Surely Congress did not intend to
condone such an intrusive and unwarranted invasion of
privacy when it enacted the Wiretap Act “to protect
against the unauthorized interception of electronic
communications.” S. Rep. No. 99-541 (1986), at 1; see
also Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868,
875 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The legislative history of the
[Wiretap Act] suggests that Congress wanted to
protect electronic communications that are configured
to be private, such as email.”); In re Pharmatrak, Inc.
Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2003) (“The
paramount objective of the Wiretap Act is to protect
effectively the privacy of communications.”).
The definition of “readily accessible to the general
public” in § 2510(16) is limited to “radio
communication,” and does not encompass all “electronic
communication.” Congress’s decision to carve out
“radio communication” for less protection than some
other types of “electronic communication” makes sense
if “radio communication” is given its ordinary meaning.
Traditional radio services can be easily and mistakenly
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intercepted by hobbyists. See 132 Cong. Rec. S7987-04
(1986) (“In order to address radio hobbyists’ concerns,
we modified the original language of S. 1667 to clarify
that intercepting traditional radio services is not
unlawful.”). But “radio hobbyists” do not mistakenly
use packet sniffers to intercept payload data
transmitted on Wi-Fi networks.
Lending “radio
communication” a broad definition that encompasses
data transmitted on Wi-Fi networks would obliterate
Congress’s compromise and create absurd applications
of the exemption for intercepting unencrypted radio
communications.
For example, § 2511(2)(g)(ii)(II)
exempts from liability, inter alia, the act of
intercepting “any radio communication which is
transmitted … by any governmental, law enforcement
… or public safety communications system, including
police and fire, readily accessible to the general public.”
This provision reinforces the work performed by
§ 2511(2)(g)(i), which already exempts a “radio
communication” that is “readily accessible to the
general public.” Congress’s decision to ensure that
these communications were exempt makes sense if
“radio
communication”
encompasses
only
predominantly auditory broadcasts since these
transmissions can be picked up by widely available
police scanners. But if “radio communication” includes
data transmitted over Wi-Fi networks, then
§ 2511(2)(g)(ii)(II) also underscores that liability should
not attach to intercepting data from an unencrypted
Wi-Fi network operated by, say, a police department or
government agency. It seems doubtful that Congress
wanted to emphasize that Google or anyone else could
park outside of a police station that carelessly failed to
secure its Wi-Fi network and intercept confidential
data with impunity.
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Next, Google strenuously argues that the rest of
the Wiretap Act supports its position that “radio
communication” in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16) means “any
information transmitted using radio waves.” Google
leans heavily on § 2510(16)(D) and the accompanying
legislative history, which together suggest that cellular
telephone and paging systems are a form of “radio
communication.” If cell phone and paging systems are
a type of “radio communication,” Google argues, it must
be the case that Congress intended that the phrase
include Wi-Fi networks and the rest of the radio
spectrum because these technologies differ from
paradigmatic radio communications like AM/FM, CB,
and shortwave transmissions.
But cell phone
communications were not dissimilar from CB,
shortwave, or other two-way forms of traditional radio
broadcasts when § 2510(16)(D) was added to the
Wiretap Act in 1986 as part of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100
Stat. 1848. When Congress enacted § 2510(16)(D), cell
phones were still called “cellular radiotelephones.” See
H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, at 20 (1986). As with other audio
broadcasts, cellular conversations were often
inadvertently picked up by radio hobbyists “scanning
radio frequencies in order to receive public
communications.” S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 3560 (1986);
see also H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, at 20 (“Cellular
telephone calls can be intercepted by either
sophisticated scanners designed for that purpose, or by
regular radio scanners modified to intercept cellular
calls”). The fact that technology has evolved and
cellular communications are no longer as similar to CB
broadcasts as they once were does not require us to
read
“radio
communication”
to
include
all
communications made using radio waves. Rather, the

53a
historical context surrounding Congress’s protection of
cellular conversations as a form of a “radio
communication” is consistent with the commonsense
definition of the term because, at the time of the
enactment of the definition in 1986, cellular
conversations could have reasonably been construed as
analogous to a form of two-way radio.6 Assuming,
arguendo, that the phrase “radio communication”
covers cell phone transmissions as they existed in 1986
does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that it also
encompasses transmissions that are plainly not
predominantly auditory broadcasts, such as payload
data transmitted over a Wi-Fi network.
Google also looks beyond the Wiretap Act in an
effort to fit its expansive definition of “radio
communication” into the statutory scheme. It points
out that the Communications Act expressly defines the
phrases “radio communication” and “communication by
radio” broadly to include “the transmission by radio of
writing, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds of all
6

With modern advances in cellular technology, it is less clear
how cell phones would fit within the statutory scheme today. We
need not resolve this question here.
Whether cell phone
transmissions are an example of a “radio communication” is
relevant to defining the phrase, but it is not a precursor to
observing that a “radio communication” is ordinarily a
predominantly auditory broadcast or to holding that payload data
transmitted over a Wi-Fi network is not a “radio communication.”
We previously held that cell phone communications are “wire
communications” for purposes of the Wiretap Act, but we did not
address whether they are an example of a “radio communication.”
See In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing Roving Interception of
Oral Commc'ns, 349 F.3d 1132, 1138 n.12 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Despite
the apparent wireless nature of cellular phones, communications
using cellular phones are considered wire communications under
the statute, because cellular telephones use wire and cable
connections when connecting calls.”).
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kinds.” 47 U.S.C. § 153(40). But when Congress
wanted
to
borrow
a
definition
from
the
Communications Act to apply to the Wiretap Act, it
expressly said so. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (giving the
phrase “communication common carrier” the meaning
that it has “in section 3 of the Communications Act”).
Here, Congress refrained from incorporating the
definition of “radio communication” used in the
Communications Act. And, as previously discussed, the
Wiretap Act uses the phrases “radio communication”
and “communication by radio” differently, indicating
that Congress did not intend to import the
Communications Act’s definition, which treats them as
synonyms. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(40). Furthermore, the
Communication
Act’s
definition
of
“radio
communication”
encompasses
technologies
like
television by including “the transmission by radio of …
pictures … of all kinds,” 47 U.S.C. § 153(40), while the
Wiretap Act sometimes distinguishes them. See, e.g.,
18 U.S.C. § 2520(c)(1) (providing specified penalties
when the “violation of this chapter is the private
viewing of a private satellite video communication that
is not scrambled or encrypted or if the communication
is a radio communication that is transmitted on
[frequencies specified by regulation]”).
Separate
references to television-related communications would
be redundant when paired with the phrase “radio
communication” if we were to assume that the
Communication Act’s definition applied to the Wiretap
Act. Importantly, the presumption that a definition set
out in one part of the code is intended to govern
another is hardly unyielding in the face of such
contradictory evidence. See, e.g., General Dynamics
Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 595 (2004)
(holding that the word “age” carries a different
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meaning in different sections of the ADEA); Robinson
v. Shell Oil, 519 U.S. 337, 343 (1997) (holding that the
term “employees” carries a different meaning in
different sections of Title VII).
Google also leans heavily on a series of
amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16) to argue that
Congress impliedly gave the phrase “radio
communication” a meaning other than the ordinary one
that we adopt here. In 1990, Senator Patrick Leahy
commissioned a task force to study the effect of new
technologies, including the precursors to wireless
networking, on the statutory scheme created in 1986 by
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. See S.
Hrg. 103-1022, at 179 (1994). In its report, the task
force indicated it was concerned that communications
by “‘wireless modems’ which can transmit data
between computers … will not be protected unless the
user goes to the expense of full data encryption.” Id. at
183. The section of the report on “Wireless Data
Communications” concluded that “[t]he task force
recommends appropriate amendments to legally
protect digital communications of this type from
unauthorized interception.” Id. In short, the task force
was of the opinion that the version of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(16) enacted in 1986 did not adequately protect
unencrypted “wireless data communications.” The task
force must have implicitly decided that “wireless data
communications” were a “radio communication”
because otherwise it would not have been concerned
with § 2510(16), which only applies to “radio
communication.” See id.
In 1994, Congress amended § 2510(16) to add a new
category of communication—which it called an
“electronic communication”—that it deemed to be a
“radio communication” that was not “readily accessible
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to the general public.” In relevant part, the statute
provided that “‘readily accessible to the general public’
means, with respect to a radio communication, that
such communication is not … (F) an electronic
communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16) (1994). Google
claims that Congress added § 2510(16)(F) in 1994 in
order to protect from interception new technologies
that transmitted data using radio frequencies, including
the contemporary versions of wireless networks.
There is some support for this proposition in the
congressional record. See H.R. Rep. No. 103-827, at 18
(1994) (explaining that the bill “[e]xtends privacy
protections of the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act to cordless phones and certain data
communications transmitted by radio”).
The significance of all of this is that Congress
repealed 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16)(F) in 1996. Google
attempts to draw a series of inferences from the 1994
and 1996 amendments: The 1994 Congress thought
that data transmissions across the wireless networks of
the day were a type of “radio communication.”
Otherwise, Congress would not have needed to amend
§ 2510(16) in order to shield them from interception
given that the provision only applies to “radio
communication.” By deleting § 2510(16)(F), the 1996
Congress removed the sole protection for unencrypted
data transmissions over wireless networks by
returning § 2510(16) to its pre-amendment form. From
Google’s perspective, the upshot of this historical
narrative is that payload data transmitted over an
unencrypted Wi-Fi network is a “radio communication”
that is “readily accessible to the general public” before
the 1994 amendment and, crucially, after the 1996
repeal.
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This evidence of congressional action and inaction
is far more equivocal than Google acknowledges. First,
the task force’s report does not control what the phrase
“radio communication” meant to Congress when it
enacted § 2510(16) in 1986. The task force’s report
suggests that it thought that the “wireless data
communication” technology that existed in 1991
entailed “radio communication” as the phrase is used in
§ 2510(16). But the task force’s opinion on questions of
statutory interpretation has no independent authority;
it is not charged with divining congressional intent.
The task force’s recommendation informs us that in
1991 a group of fifteen individuals thought that early
versions of wireless networks involved “radio
communication” under the statute. Their opinion is not
indicative of what Congress intended when it included
the phrase in the Wiretap Act. It may be considered
evidence of the phrase’s ordinary meaning. But it does
not outweigh the more substantial evidence, discussed
at length above, indicating that the ordinary meaning of
“radio communication” excludes data transmitted over
a Wi-Fi network.
Second, Congress’s decision to add § 2510(16)(F) in
1994 does not prove that it thought data transmitted
over a Wi-Fi network constituted a “radio
communication.” The 1994 Congress was certainly
concerned about ensuring that “certain data
communications transmitted by radio” were protected
from interception. But that does not necessarily mean
that it was of the view that such communications were
a “radio communication” under § 2510(16). Congress
might have been forestalling the possibility that
evolving technologies would be construed as radio
communications, contrary to the ordinary meaning of
the phrase.
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Third, and perhaps most importantly, there is no
reliable indication of what the 1996 Congress intended
to accomplish by repealing § 2510(16)(F). Google mines
the 1991 task force report and the 1994 congressional
record, but it cannot close the loop on its argument
because the 1996 Congress did not leave behind the
snippets of enactment history that are essential to
Google’s narrative. Consider two possible rationales
for the 1996 repeal of § 2510(16)(F): first, Congress
might have deleted the provision because it found it
redundant. That is, Congress might have thought that
data transmitted over a radio frequency was not a
“radio communication,” which would render the
additional protection for such communications offered
by § 2510(16)(F) unnecessary.
Alternatively, Congress might have (correctly)
determined that § 2510(16)(F) made the statute
incoherent.
Recall that the short-lived provision
provided that “‘readily accessible to the general public’
means, with respect to a radio communication, that
such communication is not … (F) an electronic
communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16)(F) (1994). The
phrase “electronic communication” has been broadly
defined since the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act of 1986. In 1994, when § 2510(16)(F) was added,
the Wiretap Act provided—as it still does today—that
“‘electronic communication’ means any transfer of
signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or
intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in
part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic
or photooptical system that affects interstate
commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12). As Google stresses
in its briefs, and the statute plainly states, “radio
communication”
is
a
subset
of
“electronic
communication.” Yet § 2510(16)(F) conveyed that a
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“radio communication” was not “readily accessible to
the general public” if it was an “electronic
communication,” which incoherently implies that the
latter was a subset of the former. The repeal of
§ 2510(16)(F) could, therefore, have been a
housekeeping matter designed to resolve this internal
tension without affecting the protection afforded
“electronic communications, including data” that the
1994 Congress sought to protect.
Neither of these entirely plausible explanations for
the amendment and repeal are consistent with Google’s
assumption that the pre-1994 conception of “radio
communication” included data transmitted over a Wi-Fi
network and the 1996 repeal of § 2510(16)(F) sought to
restore that conception. The point is that we do not
know why the 1996 Congress deleted § 2510(16)(F).
We choose to rely on the ordinary meaning of the
phrase “radio communication” rather than follow a trail
of enactment history that culminates in silence and
then speculate as to Congress’s unexpressed intent.
Finally, Google’s fall back position is that the rule
of lenity dictates that we accept its proposed definition
of “radio communication.” Although this is a civil suit,
the Wiretap Act also carries criminal penalties so
Google’s reliance on the rule of lenity is not unfounded.
See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004)
(“Because we must interpret the statute consistently,
whether we encounter its application in a criminal or
noncriminal context, the rule of lenity applies.”). But
we do not resort to the rule of lenity every time a
difficult question of statutory interpretation arises.
Rather, “the rule of lenity only applies if, after
considering text, structure, history, and purpose, there
remains a ‘grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the
statute.’” Barber v. Thomas, 130 S. Ct. 2499, 2508
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(2010) (citations omitted); see also Smith v. United
States, 508 U.S. 223, 239 (1993) (“The mere possibility
of articulating a narrower construction [ ] does not
make the rule of lenity applicable. Instead, that
venerable rule is reserved for cases where, ‘[a]fter
“seizing every thing from which aid can be derived,”’
the Court is ‘left with an ambiguous statute.’”)
(citations omitted). Here, the traditional tools of
statutory interpretation are sufficient. The ordinary
meaning of “radio communication” is consistent with
the structure of the Act and avoids absurd results
without running afoul of any clearly expressed
congressional intent. We need not resort to the rule of
lenity where, as here, the ambiguity can be fairly
resolved.
B. Wi-Fi Transmissions Are Not “Readily Accessible
to the General Public” under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511(2)(g)(i)
In the previous section, we concluded that payload
data transmitted over a Wi-Fi network is not a “radio
communication” under 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16). As a
result, the definition of “readily accessible to the
general public” in § 2510(16) does not apply to the
exemption
for
intercepting
an
“electronic
communication” that is “readily accessible to the
general public” in § 2511(2)(g)(i). But that does not end
the inquiry. Although payload data transmitted over
an unencrypted Wi-Fi network is not “readily
accessible to the general public” by definition solely
because it is an unencrypted “radio communication,” it
is still possible for a transmission that falls outside of
the purview of the § 2510(16) definition to be
considered “readily accessible to the general public”
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under the ordinary meaning of that phrase.7 We now
hold, in agreement with the district court, that payload
data transmitted over an unencrypted Wi-Fi network is
not “readily accessible to the general public” and,
consequently, that Google cannot avail itself of the
§ 2511(2)(g)(i) exemption.
First, Wi-Fi transmissions are not “readily”
available because they are geographically limited and
fail to travel far beyond the walls of the home or office
where the access point is located. Google was only able
to intercept the plaintiffs’ communications because its
Street View vehicles passed by the street outside of
each plaintiff’s house. The FCC generally limits the
peak output of Wi-Fi broadcasts to 1 watt. See 47
C.F.R. § 15.247(b). Meanwhile, AM, FM, and other
traditional radio broadcasts typically range from 250 to
100,000 watts.
See Fed. Commc’n Comm’n,
Encyclopedia – FM Broadcast Station Classes and
Service Countours, available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/
files/ntia/publications/2003-allochrt.pdf (last visited
Aug. 13, 2013); see also Fed. Commc’n Comm’n,
7

The phrase “readily accessible to the general public” is only
defined insofar as the communication at issue is a “radio
communication.” See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16) (“‘readily accessible to
the general public’ means, with respect to a radio communication
…”). The phrase is undefined where, as here, the transmission is
an “electronic communication” that is not a “radio communication.”
Since the term at issue is undefined, we look to its ordinary
meaning. See Hamilton, 130 S. Ct. at 2471 (“When terms used in a
statute are undefined, we give them their ordinary meaning.”).
Joffe does not dispute that payload data transmitted over a Wi-Fi
network is an “electronic communication,” which the Act defines
as “any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or
intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a
wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical
system that affects interstate or foreign commerce” subject to
specific exceptions that do not apply here. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12).

62a
Encyclopedia – AM Broadcast Station Classes; Clear,
Regional, and Local, available at http://www.fcc.gov/
encyclopedia/am-broadcast-stationclasses-clear-regionaland-local-channels (last visited Aug. 13, 2013). As a
result, AM radio stations have a service range of up to
100 miles, while individual Wi-Fi access points usually
have a range of less than 330 feet. See Fed. Commc’n
Comm’n, Encyclopedia – Why AM Radio Stations
Must Reduce Power, Change Operations, or Cease
Broadcasting
at
Night,
http://www.fcc.gov/
encyclopedia/why-am-radio-stations-must-reduce-power
-changeoperations-or-cease-broadcasting-night
(last
visited Aug. 13, 2013); Encyclopedia Brittanica Online,
Wi-Fi,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/
1473553/Wi-Fi (last visited Aug. 13, 2013).
Second, the payload data transmitted over
unencrypted Wi-Fi networks is only “accessible” with
some difficulty. Unlike traditional radio broadcasts, a
Wi-Fi access point cannot associate or communicate
with a wireless device until it has been authenticated.
See IEEE Computer Soc’y, IEEE Standard for
Information Technology — Telecommunications and
Information Exchange Between Systems — Local and
Metropolitan Area Networks — Specific Requirements:
Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC)
and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications 473, Fig. 116 (2007).
Devices on Wi-Fi networks—even
unencrypted networks—communicate via encoded
messages sent to a specific destination over the
wireless channel. Id. Therefore, intercepting and
decoding payload data communicated on a Wi-Fi
network requires sophisticated hardware and software.
To capture this information, a wireless device must
initiate a connection with the network and send
encapsulated and coded data over the network to a
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specific destination.
If the communications were
intercepted by a traditional analog radio device they
would sound indistinguishable from random noise. WiFi transmissions are not “readily accessible” to the
“general public” because most of the general public
lacks the expertise to intercept and decode payload
data transmitted over a Wi-Fi network.8 Even if it is
commonplace for members of the general public to
connect to a neighbor’s unencrypted Wi-Fi network,
members of the general public do not typically
mistakenly intercept, store, and decode data
transmitted by other devices on the network.
Consequently, we conclude that Wi-Fi communications
are sufficiently inaccessible that they do not constitute
an “electronic communication … readily accessible to
the general public” under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i) as
the phrase is ordinarily understood.

8

Google argues that unencrypted data transmitted over a WiFi network is “readily accessible to the general public” because the
hardware used to intercept the data can be purchased by anyone
and the software used to decode the data can be downloaded from
the internet. A district court also reached this conclusion in a
patent case. See In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig.,
886 F. Supp. 2d 888, 893 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (“In light of the ease of
sniffing Wi–Fi networks, the court concludes that the
communications sent on an unencrypted Wi–Fi network are
readily accessible to the general public.”). The availability of the
technology necessary to intercept the communication cannot be
the sole determinant of whether it is “readily accessible to the
general public” as the phrase is ordinarily understood. A device
that surreptitiously logs a computer user’s keystrokes can be
purchased online and easily installed, but that hardly means that
every keystroke—whether over a wired or a wireless connection—
is “readily accessible to the general public.”
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment
of the district court.
AFFIRMED.
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APPENDIX C
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
IN RE GOOGLE INC. STREET VIEW ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS LITIGATION
No. C 10-MD-02184 JW
Filed: June 29, 2011
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN
PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS WITH
LEAVE TO AMEND

I.

INTRODUCTION

1

Plaintiffs bring this putative class action against
Google, Inc. (“Defendant”), alleging three causes of
action for violation of the federal Wiretap Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2511, et seq., violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof.
Code §§ 17200, et seq., and violation of various state
wiretap statutes. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant
intentionally intercepted data packets, including
payload data, from Plaintiffs’ Wi-Fi networks utilizing
specially designed packet sniffer software installed on
Defendant’s Google Street View vehicles.
1

Plaintiffs are Patrick Keyes, Matthew Berlage, Aaron
Linsky, James Fairbanks, Jeffrey Colman, John Redstone, Karl
Schulz, Dean Bastilla, Vicki Van Valin, Stephanie and Russell
Carter, Danielle Reyas, Bertha Davis, Jason Taylor, Jennifer
Locsin, James Blackwell, Rich Benitti, Benjamin Joffe, Lilla
Marigza, Wesley Hartline, David Binkley and Eric Myhre.
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Presently before the Court is Defendant’s Motion
to Dismiss.2 The Court conducted a hearing on March
21, 2011. Based on the papers submitted to date and
oral argument, the Court GRANTS in part and
DENIES in part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Allegations
In a Consolidated Class Action Complaint filed on
November 8, 2011,3 Plaintiffs allege as follows:
Plaintiffs are individuals who reside in various
states,4 and who maintained a Wi-Fi network in
their homes that was not readily accessible to the
general public and used the Wi-Fi connection to
send and receive various types of payload data,
including usernames, passwords and personal
emails. (CCAC ¶¶ 18-38.) Each of Plaintiffs’
homes can be seen depicted on Google Maps and
Google Street View. (Id.) Defendant Google
develops and hosts a broad range of Internet-based
services and is incorporated under the laws of
Delaware with its principal place of business in
Mountain View, California. (Id. ¶ 39.)
Defendant launched Google Street View on
May 25, 2007 in several select cities across the
United States. (CCAC ¶ 55.) In the last three
2

(Defendant Google Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’
Consolidated Class Action Complaint, hereafter, “Motion,” Docket
Item No. 60.)
3
(Consolidated Class Action Complaint, hereafter, “CCAC,”
Docket Item No. 54.)
4

Plaintiffs are citizens and residents of Washington, D.C.;
Ohio; Pennsylvania; Nevada; Tennessee; Washington; California;
Illinois; and Oregon. (CCAC ¶¶ 18-38.)
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years, Google Street View has expanded broadly
and now includes more cities and rural areas in the
United States, and has expanded worldwide into
more than 30 countries. (Id.) Google Street View
is a feature embedded within Defendant’s Google
Maps program that offers panoramic views of
various positions along streets using photos taken
from a fleet of specially adapted vehicles commonly
known as Google Street View vehicles. (Id. ¶¶ 54,
55.) Each Google Street View vehicle is equipped
with nine directional cameras to capture 360 degree
views of the streets and 3G/GSM/Wi-Fi antennas
with custom-designed software for the capture and
storage of wireless signals and data. (Id. ¶ 55.)
Additionally, Defendant used smaller vehicles,
commonly known as Google Trikes, also outfitted
with the cameras and Wi-Fi equipment, to capture
photo and Wi-Fi data from areas inaccessible to
cars. (Id. ¶ 58.) While Defendant issued press
releases to the public to disclose its intent to utilize
the vehicles in order to capture photo data,
Defendant failed to disclose its intent to also
capture Wi-Fi data. (Id. ¶ 56.)
In 2006, prior to the launch of the Google Street
View vehicles, Defendant’s employee engineers
intentionally created a data collection system that
included code that sampled, collected, decoded and
analyzed all types of data broadcast through Wi-Fi
connections. (CCAC ¶¶ 60-61.) This data collection
system is commonly known as a packet analyzer,
wireless sniffer, network analyzer, packet sniffer or
protocol analyzer. (Id. ¶ 61.) Defendant authorized
inclusion of this wireless sniffer technology into its
Google Street View vehicles and even sought to
patent the process. (Id. ¶ 65.) The wireless sniffer
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secretly captures data packets as they stream
across Wi-Fi connections and then decodes or
decrypts the data packet and analyzes the contents.
(Id. ¶ 62.) In order to view the contents of the data
packets captured by the wireless sniffer in a
readable form, the packets must be stored on
digital media and then decoded using cryptoanalysis or a similarly complicated technology. (Id.
¶ 63.) As such, the data packets are not readable
by the general public absent this sophisticated
decoding and processing technology. (Id. ¶ 64.)
Defendant has admitted to storing this data on
their servers. (Id. ¶ 6.) The content of the data
packets collected by Defendant included Plaintiffs’
SSID information (the Wi-Fi network name), MAC
address (the ID number of the Wi-Fi network’s
hardware), usernames, passwords and personal
emails. (Id. ¶¶ 66, 69.)
On April 27, 2010, in response to an inquiry
from a European privacy authority, Defendant
posted an entry explaining that it had collected
SSIDs and MAC addresses.
(CCAC ¶ 69.)
However, at that time, Defendant claimed to have
not collected any payload, or content data from the
packets. (Id. ¶ 70.) On May 14, 2010, following a
request by the privacy authority to audit packet
data collected by Defendant, Defendant admitted to
collecting “fragmentary” samples of “publicly
broadcast” payload data from open (i.e.,
nonpassword-protected) Wi-Fi networks and that,
through this conduct, it had collected about 600
gigabytes of data from more than 30 countries. (Id.
¶¶ 71-72, 110.) Prior to May 14, 2010, Plaintiffs
were unaware of and could not have discovered the
existence of Defendant’s unlawful conduct. (Id.
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¶¶ 100-10.) On June 9, 2010, Defendant admitted
that it had been collecting Wi-Fi data in the United
States via Google Street View vehicles since 2007.
(Id. ¶ 80.) On July 9, 2010, Defendant issued an
apology on its Official Google Australia Blog where
it admitted to intercepting the data in an attempt
to improve Defendant’s location-based services,
e.g., search and maps. (Id. ¶ 100.) In October 2010,
Defendant was forced to admit, following
continuing investigations, that it had intercepted
whole emails, usernames, passwords and other
private data. (Id. ¶ 77.)
On the basis of the allegations outlined above,
Plaintiffs allege three causes of action: (1) violation of
the federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, et seq.; (2)
violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.; and
(3) violation of various state wiretap statutes. (CCAC
at 28-31.)
B. Procedural History
On August 17, 2010, the United States Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred eight
pending actions to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407. (See Docket Item No. 1.) On October 18, 2010,
the Court appointed Jeffrey Kodoff of Spector
Roseman Kodroff & Willis, P.C. and Daniel Small of
Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll, PLLC as Interim Class
and Co-Lead Counsel and Elizabeth Cabraser of Lieff
Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP as Interim Class
and Liaison Counsel. (See Docket Item No. 47.) On
November 8, 2010, Plaintiffs filed their Consolidated
Class Action Complaint. (See CCAC.)
On March 21, 2011, the Court conducted a hearing
on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. That same day, the
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Court issued an Order directing the parties to submit
supplemental briefs addressing three questions: (1)
what “radio communication” means within the purview
of the Wiretap Act; (2) whether wireless home internet
networks are “radio communications” within the
purview of the Wiretap Act’s usage of that term; and
(3) whether cellular telephone calls constitute “radio
communications” as intended by Congress when
drafting the Wiretap Act and, if so, whether such
technology properly fits within any of the five
enumerated exceptions to the definition of “readily
accessible to the general public” as outlined in Section
2510(16). (See Docket Item No. 73.) On April 11, 2011,
the parties timely filed their Supplemental Briefs. (See
Docket Item Nos. 79, 80.) Also on April 11, 2011, the
Electronic Privacy Information Center filed a Brief for
Amicus Curiae in support of Plaintiffs. (See Docket
Item No. 80.)
Presently before the Court is Defendant’s Motion
to Dismiss.
III. STANDARDS
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed against a
defendant for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted against that defendant. Dismissal may
be based on either the lack of a cognizable legal theory
or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a
cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police
Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990); Robertson v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9th
Cir. 1984). For purposes of evaluating a motion to
dismiss, the court “must presume all factual allegations
of the complaint to be true and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Usher v.
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City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987).
Any existing ambiguities must be resolved in favor of
the pleading. Walling v. Beverly Enters., 476 F.2d 393,
396 (9th Cir. 1973).
However, mere conclusions couched in factual
allegations are not sufficient to state a cause of action.
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986); see also
McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 810 (9th
Cir. 1988). The complaint must plead “enough facts to
state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A
claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
1949 (2009). Thus, “for a complaint to survive a motion
to dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and
reasonable inferences from that content, must be
plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to
relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969
(9th Cir. 2009). Courts may dismiss a case without
leave to amend if the plaintiff is unable to cure the
defect by amendment. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122,
1129 (9th Cir. 2000).
IV. DISCUSSION
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint
on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiffs have failed to plead
that their Wi-Fi broadcasts were not “readily
accessible” and thus, Defendant is entitled to
exemption from liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i),
one of the Wiretap Act’s exemptions (“exemption G1”);
(2) Plaintiffs’ claims based on state law wiretap statutes
are preempted by the Wiretap Act and, alternatively,
fail to state a claim; and (3) Plaintiffs’ “unlawful” and
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“unfair” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 claims are also
preempted by the Wiretap Act and, alternatively, fail
to state a claim or plead standing under Proposition 64.
(Motion at 5-19.) Plaintiffs respond that dismissal is
improper as: (1) the Wiretap Act’s statutory definition
of “readily accessible” relied on by Defendant solely
applies to “radio communications” under § 2511(2)(g)(ii)
(“exemption G2”) and is, thus, inapplicable to
“electronic communications” under exemption G1 and
the ordinary meaning of “readily accessible” should be
used; (2) additionally, exemption G1 only applies to
unlawful interception and access, and Plaintiffs allege
that Defendant further used and disclosed the
intercepted communications; (3) the state wiretap
statutes are not preempted by the Wiretap Act either
expressly, by field preemption, or by conflict; and (4)
claims under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.,
are not preempted by the Wiretap Act as they are
qualitatively different and are properly pleaded.
(Opp’n at 3-25.) The Court addresses each ground in
turn.
A. Wiretap Act
Defendant contends that Plaintiffs’ Wi-Fi
broadcasts were “readily accessible to the general
public,” per the statutory definition provided in Section
2510(16) of the Wiretap Act, such that exemption G1
obviates Defendant’s liability for any alleged
interceptions. (Motion at 5-12.) Plaintiffs respond that
the Section 2510(16) definition of “readily accessible to
the general public” applies solely to “radio
communications,” as specified, and thus would only
apply to exemption G2 (“radio communications”) and
not exemption G1 (“electronic communications”).
(Opp’n at 2-10.)
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The Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) provides a
private right of action against:
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this
chapter any person who—
(a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to
intercept, or procures any other person to
intercept or endeavor to intercept, any
wire, oral, or electronic communication; …
(c) intentionally discloses, or endeavors to
disclose, to any other person the contents
of any wire, oral, or electronic
communication, knowing or having reason
to know that the information was obtained
through the interception of a wire, oral, or
electronic communication in violation of
this subsection; [or]
(d) intentionally uses, or endeavors to use, the
contents of any wire, oral, or electronic
communication, knowing or having reason
to know that the information was obtained
through the interception of a wire, oral, or
electronic communication in violation of
this subsection; … .
However, Section 2511(2) provides exemptions to
Section 2511(1)’s private right of action:
(g) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter or
chapter 121 of this title for any person—
(i) to intercept or access an electronic
communication made through an electronic
communication system that is configured so
that such electronic communication is
readily accessible to the general public;
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(ii) to intercept any radio communication
which is transmitted—
(I) by any station for the use of the
general public, or that relates to ships,
aircraft, vehicles or persons in distress;
(II) by any governmental, law enforcement,
civil defense, private land mobile, or
public safety communications system,
including police and fire, readily
accessible to the general public;
(III) by a station operating on an authorized
frequency within the bands allocated to
the amateur, citizens band, or general
mobile radio services; or
(IV) by any marine or aeronautical
communications system; … .
Section 2510(16) provides the sole definition in the
Wiretap Act for “readily accessible to the general
public”:
(16) “readily accessible to the general public”
means, with respect to a radio communication,
that such communication is not—
(A) scrambled or encrypted;
(B) transmitted using modulation techniques
whose essential parameters have been
withheld from the public with the intention
of preserving the privacy of such
communication;
(C) carried on a subcarrier or other signal
subsidiary to a radio transmission;
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(D) transmitted over a communication system
provided by a common carrier, unless the
communication is a tone only paging
system communication; or
(E) transmitted on frequencies allocated under
part 25, subpart D, E, or F of part 74, or
part 94 of the Rules of the Federal
Communications Commission, unless, in
the case of a communication transmitted on
a frequency allocated under part 74 that is
not exclusively allocated to broadcast
auxiliary services, the communication is a
two-way communication by radio; … .
18 U.S.C. § 2510.
The matter before the Court presents a case of first
impression as to whether the Wiretap Act imposes
liability upon a defendant who allegedly intentionally
intercepts data packets from a wireless home network.
The case also presents a novel question of statutory
interpretation as to how the definition in Section
2510(16) of “readily accessible to the general public”
modifies exemption G1, if at all.
In establishing the standard principles of statutory
construction, the Supreme Court has held that the
starting point at which courts should discern
congressional intent is always the existing statutory
text. Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004).
Unless a court finds the existing statutory text such
that a plain meaning interpretation would lead to
absurd results, the court is bound to enforce the
existing text according to its terms. Id. (citing Hartford
Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A.,
530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)). “In ascertaining the plain meaning
of the statute, the court must look to the particular
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statutory language at issue, as well as the language and
design of the statute as a whole.” K-Mart Corp. v.
Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988). One measure of
ambiguity is that the statutory text at issue is fairly
capable of more than one interpretation. Chickasaw
Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 90 (2001). Should
a court find the statutory text ambiguous or should a
plain text reading fail to yield a definitive
interpretation, a court may then turn to the legislative
history in order to add context to the statute. SEC v.
McCarthy, 322 F.3d 650, 655 (9th Cir. 2003).
1.

Plain Text Reading

In this case, Congress has not expressly declared
its intent as to how Section 2510(16) should apply to
exemption G1 in the plain text of the statute, nor has
Congress defined “radio communication” anywhere
within the Act. As Congress has not provided a
definition for “radio communication” within the
confines of the Act, the Court first attempts to discern
the ordinary and plain meaning of the term from the
context of its use, from dictionary references and from
Congress’ use of similar terms within the Act.
a.

Statutory Text

Section 2510(16) defines “readily accessible to the
general public” as it pertains specifically to “radio
communication” by first establishing a presumption of
ready accessibility and then defining five types of radio
communications which would be expressly excluded
from that presumption. Notably, none of the five
express exemptions from ready accessibility under
Section 2510(16) specifically address wireless internet
technologies, as the list predominantly addresses radio
broadcast technologies. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(16)(A)-
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(E). In addition to Section 2510(16), the Act uses the
term “radio communication” on three other occasions.
First, Section 2511(2)(g), which provides five
exceptions to liability for intentional interception of
wire, oral or electronic communications, makes it lawful
to intentionally intercept:
[A]ny radio communication which is transmitted—
(I) by any station for the use of the general public,
or that relates to ships, aircraft, vehicles, or
person in distress;
(II) by any governmental, law enforcement, civil
defense, private land mobile, or public safety
communications system, including police and
fire, readily accessible to the general public;
(III) by a station operating on an authorized
frequency within the bands allocated to the
amateur, citizens band, or general mobile radio
services; or
(IV) by any marine or aeronautical communications
system; … .
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(ii). Second, Section 2511(2)(g)
also makes it lawful “for other users of the same
frequency to intercept any radio communication made
through a system that utilizes frequencies monitored
by individuals engaged in the provision or the use of
such system, if such communication is not scrambled or
encrypted.” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(v). Finally, Section
2511(5)(a)(i)(B) makes unlawful and authorizes a right
of action for the federal government to bring suit in
federal court for the interception of “a radio
communication that is transmitted on frequencies
allocated under subpart D of part 74 of the rules of the
Federal Communications Commission that is not
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scrambled or encrypted and the conduct in violation of
this chapter is not for a tortious or illegal purpose or for
purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage or
private commercial gain.” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(5)(a)(i)(B).
Title 47, part 74 of the rules of the Federal
Communications
Commission
pertains
to
“Experimental Radio, Auxiliary, Special Broadcast and
Other Program Distributional Services.” 47 C.F.R.
§ 74. Subpart D of part 74 regulates “Remote Pickup
Broadcast Stations.” Id. Remote pickup broadcast
stations are defined under the regulations as either a
mobile or fixed “pickup broadcast transmitter, and its
associated accessory equipment necessary to the radio
communication function.” 47 C.F.R. § 74.401.
The drafting of these provisions predated the
spread of wireless internet technologies and, thus, the
lack of any explicit reference to wireless internet
technologies does not itself preclude an interpretation
of “radio communications” that would include these
later-developed technologies. However, the usage of
“radio communication” throughout the Act does not
lend itself to a broad interpretation of the term. In
particular, references to “radio communication”
throughout the Act predominantly pertain to and are
drafted for the particular design of radio broadcast
technologies, and do not address other communications
technologies that transmit using radio waves. For
example, Section 2511(2)(g) makes it lawful to
intentionally intercept any radio communication that
“that relates to ships, aircraft, vehicles, or person in
distress,” without reference to whether such radio
communication was readily accessible to the general
public and not scrambled or encrypted. Should the
Court interpret radio communication so broadly within
the Act to include such technologies as wireless
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internet and cellular phones, this exception could lead
to absurd results.
Specifically, pursuant to this
interpretation, an unauthorized intentional monitoring
of a cellular phone call could be lawful should the
content of the communication relate to vehicles or
persons in distress, but unlawful otherwise. Further,
Section 2511(2)(g) makes it lawful to intentionally
intercept any radio communication transmitted by “any
marine or aeronautical communications system,” which
could lead to equally arbitrary results when applying
the exception to communications technologies other
than radio broadcast technologies, e.g., a Wi-Fi
network aboard an airplane.
b. Dictionary Reference
Gleaning a plain meaning reading of “radio
communication” from dictionary references is equally
as inconclusive.
The Oxford Dictionaries Online
(“ODO”) defines “radio” as “[t]he transmission and
reception of electromagnetic waves of radio frequency,
especially those carrying sound messages.” Further,
the ODO lists a number of more specific definitions for
“radio”: (1) “the activity or industry of broadcasting
sound programs”; (2) “radio programs”; (3) “an
apparatus for receiving radio programs”; (4) “an
apparatus capable of both receiving and transmitting
radio messages between individuals, ships, planes,
etc.”; (5) “ … a broadcasting station or channel.” The
ODO defines “communication,” in pertinent part, as
“the imparting or exchanging of information or news.”
However, the ODO, Merriam-Websters and the Oxford
English Dictionary do not contain any definition for
“radio communication” and, thus, fail to provide an
authoritative interpretation for the compound
formulation of the two words. On one hand, Congress
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could have intended “radio communication” to simply
combine the definition of “radio” with the definition of
“communication,” thereby creating a compound that
incorporates all communications transmitted using
radio waves. Yet, on the other hand, Congress could
have intended the compound of “radio” and
“communication” to denote communications that
involved a radio apparatus or a communication that
solely involved the transmission of sound over radio
waves. Moreover, should Congress have intended the
compound term “radio communication” to mean simply
“communication by radio waves,” it could have so
specified. Rather, Congress chose to use the compound
term, “radio communication,” a term that shares a
likeness with other compound terms used throughout
the Act that prefix “communication” with reference to
a particular form of media; each of which are provided
specialized definitions within the Act. The Court now
examines the statutory text to discern how Congress
intended compound terms to modify the independent
meaning of each word, if at all.
c.

Compound Terms

While the ECPA does not define the compound
term “radio communication,” the Act does provide
definitions for three other compound terms that
combine a form of media with the term
“oral
“communication”:
“wire
communication,”5
6
communication” and “electronic communication.”7 A
“wire communication,” as defined by the Act, means:
5

See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1).

6

See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2).

7

See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12).

81a
[A]ny aural transfer made in whole or in part
through the use of facilities for the transmission of
communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other
like connection between the point of origin and the
point of reception (including the use of such
connection in a switching station) furnished or
operated by any person engaged in providing or
operating such facilities for the transmission of
interstate
or
foreign
communications
or
communications affecting interstate or foreign
commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 1210(1).
The Act defines “oral
communication” as “any oral communication uttered by
a person exhibiting an expectation that such
communication is not subject to interception under
circumstances justifying such expectation, but such
term does not include any electronic communication.”
18 U.S.C. § 1210(2).
Finally, an “electronic
communication” is defined as:
[A]ny transfer of signs, signals, writing,
images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature
transmitted in whole or in part by wire, radio,
electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical
system that affects interstate or foreign commerce,
but does not include—
(A) any wire or oral communication;
(B) any communication made through a tone-only
paging device;
(C) any communication from a tracking device (as
defined in section 3117 of this title);
or
(D) electronic funds transfer information stored by
a financial institution in a communication
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system used for the electronic storage and
transfer of funds … .
18 U.S.C. § 1210(12).
In defining these compound terms, Congress
intended more refined definitions than simply
combining the independent meanings of each word into
a unified whole, e.g., electronic communication is not
defined as any communication transmitted by
electronic means. Rather, Congress provided nuanced
definitions of each compound term; in part, to mitigate
confusion in light of the inevitable overlap between
terms.
For example, electronic communication
expressly
includes
electronic
communications
transmitted in whole or in part by wire, but excludes
wire communications. Moreover, Congress did not
define “wire communication” as any communication
transmitted by wire, but limited the definition to
incorporate solely “aural communications” transmitted
by wire. Congress also expressly included
communications transmitted in whole or in part by
radio as a form of electronic communication, such that
an
interpretation
of
the
compound
“radio
communication” as all communications by radio would
render all communications technologies that transmit
using radio waves electronic communications. An
interpretation of “radio communication” that
presumptively included all technologies that transmit
over radio waves, such as cellular phones, under the
purview of electronic communications and held that
technology bound by Section 2510(16)’s definition of
“readily accessible to the general public,” would
contravene Ninth Circuit precedent holding that
cellular
phone
communications
are
wire
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communications for purposes of the Wiretap Act.8 The
Ninth Circuit based its holding on the legislative
history of the Act, finding that, despite the apparent
wireless nature of cellular telephones, Congress
intended cellular phone technology to fall into the
meaning of wire communication based on the fact that
cellular phones transmit the communications over wire
at some point during the course of the transmission. Id.
at 1138, n.12. Rather than a simply interpret “wire
communications” as all communications by wire, the
Ninth Circuit found that Congress intended compound
terms that prefixed “communication” with a type of
media to have specialized and, at times, counterintuitive definitions. In this case, Congress did not
provide
a
specialized
definition
of
“radio
communication,” unlike wire, oral and electronic
communication. However, such an omission does not
preclude a finding that Congress intended a more
sophisticated compound meaning and, as consequence,
the meaning of “radio communication” remains open to
multiple interpretations.
Thus, the Court finds that a plain reading of “radio
communication” from the statutory text, as well as
reading the text in the context of the structure and
purpose of the Act, fails to yield a definitive and
unambiguous result. The Court now turns to the
legislative history for clarification.
2.

Legislative History

The ECPA was passed by Congress in 1986 to
amend the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
8

In the Matter of the Application of the United States for an
Order Authorizing the Roving Interception of Oral
Communications, 349 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003).
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Action of 1968, commonly known as the Wiretap Act, in
order to “update and clarify Federal privacy
protections and standards in light of dramatic changes
in
new
computer
and
telecommunications
technologies.” S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 1 (1986). Prior to
the amendment, Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act provided a private right
of action for interception of communications, however,
the statute was expressly limited to unauthorized aural
interception of wire or oral communications. Id. at 2.
In 1986, the statute was, in the words of Senator
Leahy, one of the senators who introduced the
amendment, “hopelessly out of date.” Id.
In particular, Congress intended the 1986
amendment to bring the statute in line with
“technological developments and changes in the
structure of the telecommunications industry.” S. Rep.
No. 99-541, at 2 (1986).
Congress explicitly
acknowledged the new privacy concerns faced by
individuals and businesses in light of developments in
the personal and commercial computing industries. Id.
Developments of particular interest to the Senate
Committee included the protection of privacy rights in
offsite data storage, the computer-to-computer
transmission of this data, and electronic mail. Id. In
fact, the initial development of the amendment came on
the heels of a 1984 interaction between Senator Leahy
and the Attorney General where the Senator asked the
Attorney General if electronic mail and computer-tocomputer communications were covered by the
Wiretap Act. Id. In response, the Department of
Justice expressed concern that in areas of rapid
technological development, “distinctions such as
[whether or not a reasonable expectation of privacy
exists] are not always clear or obvious.” Id. at 3. To
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this end, Congress amended the Wiretap Act in order
to provide statutory privacy protection and a civil right
of action for interceptions of electronic communications,
including,
inter
alia,
computer-to-computer
transmissions and electronic mail; contexts in which
Congress suspected the Fourth Amendment may only
dubiously apply. Id.
Another matter of importance to Congress in the
drafting of the amendment was to address concerns
expressed by radio hobbyists and users of radio
scanners that the amendment would impose liability
upon the innocent act of scanning radio broadcast
frequencies in order to reach public communications,
should the hobbyist inadvertently encroach upon
protected communication that shares the same
spectrum, for instance a cellular phone . S. Rep. No. 99541, at 4-5 (1986). An earlier version of the amendment,
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1985, S.
1667, did not include the Section 2510(16) definition of
“readily accessible to the general public” and applied
both exemptions G1 and G2 to “electronic
communication,” without any use of the term “radio
communication.”
131 Cong. Rec. S. 11795, at 4.
Following a year of hearings, at which concerns were
raised by radio hobbyists, Senator Leahy, joined by
Senator Mathias, introduced a superseding version of
the bill that incorporated explicit mention of “radio
communication,” including Section 2510(6) and
reference in exemption G2, as well as a heightened
mens rea requirement from “willful” to “intentional” to
find criminal liability for interception. S. Rep. No. 99541, at 3, 5 (1986); 132 Cong. Rec. S7987-04, at 18 (“In
order to address radio hobbyists’ concerns, we modified
the original language of S. 1667 to clarify that
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intercepting
unlawful.”).

traditional

radio

services

is

not

It was in light of these dual considerations that
Congress drafted the text that became Sections 2510
and 2511.
Section 2510(12) defines “electronic
communication” as a broad category that includes “any
transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data,
or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in
part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic
or photooptical system … .” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12). As
defined in the statute, a communication transmitted by
radio is a specific type of electronic communication,
such that exemption G1—which exempts from liability
any interception of an electronic communication that is
readily accessible to the general public—would exempt
communications transmitted by radio as well, should
those communications be “readily accessible to the
general public.” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2).
However, to clarify that “intercepting traditional
radio services” was not a violation of the Act in order to
quiet the concerns raised by radio hobbyists, Congress
added, inter alia, Section 2510(16). See, e.g., 132 Cong.
Rec. S7987-04, at 18. Section 2510(16) provides a
definition for “readily accessible to the general public”
with respect to “radio communication” that establishes
a
presumption
of
accessibility,
should
the
communication not fit within one of five delineated
exceptions. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16). Notably, each of the
five exceptions, as well as the presumption of
accessibility, are drafted for the particular technology
of traditional radio broadcast mediums and do not
address any broader radio-based communications
technology of the time, including cellular phones. The
first exception to the Section 2510(16) is for “scrambled
or encrypted” communications, which the Senate
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Report describes as “to convert the signal into
unintelligible form by means intended to protect the
contents of a communication from unintended
recipients.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16)(A); S. Rep. No. 99541, at 11 (1986).
The second exception is for
communications that have been “transmitted using
modulation techniques whose essential parameters
have been withheld from the public with the intention
of preserving the privacy of such communication.” 18
U.S.C. § 2510(16)(B). The Senate Report clarified that
“paragraph (B) refers to spread spectrum radio
communications,” which was a technology that allowed
for the transmission of a signal on “different
frequencies where the receiving station must possess
the necessary algorythm [sic] in order to reassemble
the signal.” S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 11 (1986). The third
exception is for communications “carried on a
subcarrier or other signal subsidiary to a radio
transmission,” which, according to the Senate Report,
included “data and background music services carried
on FM subcarriers.” Id. at 11-12. The fourth exception
is for communications that are “transmitted over a
communication system provided by a common carrier,”
excluding “tone only paging system communication.”
18 U.S.C. § 2510(16)(D). The fifth exception was for
communications that were transmitted on frequencies
allocated under the Rules of the Federal
Communications Commission for: (1) Part 25 (“Satellite
Communications”); (2) subparts of Part 74
(“Experimental Radio, Auxiliary, Special Broadcast
and Other Program Distributional Services”); and (3)
Part 94 (“Microwave Services”).
18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(16)(E); 47 C.F.R. § 47(24), (74), (94).
Although the ECPA never explicitly defines “radio
communication,” what the legislative history and the

88a
context of the term’s use in Section 2510(16) make clear
is that Congress intended “radio communication” to
include “traditional radio services,” such that publicdirected radio broadcast communication, as the
technology was understood at the time, would be
clearly excluded from liability under the Act. What the
legislative history also reveals, however, is that
Congress did not intend “radio communications” to be
defined so broadly such that it would encompass all
communications transmitted over radio waves. This
was made explicit in the Senate Report’s consideration
of cellular phone technology, which also uses radio
waves to transmit communications, and the clear intent
to include such technology under the protections of the
Act as a “wire communication” without any express
limitation by Section 2510(16). S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 6,
11 (1986) (“Thus, a wire communication encompasses
the whole of a voice telephone transmission even if part
of the transmission is carried by fiber optic cable or by
radio—as in the case of cellular telephones … .”).
As the legislative history demonstrates, despite the
insistence of radio scanning enthusiasts, Congress
stopped short of including a full exception to liability
under the Act for the willful monitoring of cellular
telephone calls.9 S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 6 (1986).
According to the Senate Report, this hesitation was
based on two considerations. Id. First, Congress had
made willful monitoring of telephone calls illegal in the
original 1968 Wiretap Act should at least part of the
call pass through a wire. Id. Second, the design of the
cellular phone technology made intentional monitoring
9

132 Cong. Rec. S7987-04, 1986 WL 776264, at *18 (“Under
this revised Electronic Communications Privacy bill, cellular
phones, private and public microwave services and voice or display
pagers are protected against interception.”).
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of the communication more difficult than other signals
commonly scanned. Id. Rather than exclude cellular
phone communications from the protections of the act,
the Senate Committee highlighted the possibility that
the Federal Communications Commission should
consider labeling cellular phone and radio scanning
equipment to alert the user that such technologies are
“radio-based communications” and, as such, intentional
interception of the communication could violate the
Wiretap Act. Id.
The presumption of accessibility established in
Section 2510(16) for traditional radio broadcast
technology was an appropriate response to the balance
being struck between particular electronic forms of
communication that were designed to be public, like
traditional radio broadcast, and others that were
designed to be private, like cellular phone technology.
Id.
However, to apply the presumption to all
communications transmitted using radio technology by
interpreting “radio communication” broadly would
contravene congressional intent to provide protection
for technology like cellular phones, which use radio
waves to transmit communications, but are architected
in such a way as to be private.
Thus, the Court finds that the legislative history
and text of the statute demonstrate congressional
intent to apply Section 2510(16)’s definition of “readily
accessible to the general public” to exemption G1, and
not merely to limit the application of Section 2510(16) to
“radio communications” in exemption G2. However, in
light of the legislative history and text of the statute,
the Court also finds that Section 2510(16)’s
presumption of accessibility and the requirement that a
communications technology must fit within one of five
exceptions were solely intended to apply to “traditional
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radio services.” To interpret Section 2510(16) so
broadly as to apply its strict presumption of
accessibility to all communications technology that uses
radio waves, regardless of the technology’s design,
would disregard explicit congressional intent to include
cellular phone technology within the protections of the
Act and clear Ninth Circuit precedent, holding that
cellular phone technologies are, in fact, “wire
communications.”10
Rather,
for
all
electronic
communications that could not be fairly classified as
“traditional radio services,” or radio broadcast
technology, regardless of the technology’s use of radio
waves as the medium of transmission, the Court finds
that Congress did not intend Section 2510(16)’s narrow
definition of “readily accessible to the general public” to
apply for purposes of exemption G1. The Court now
turns to examine the sufficiency of the pleadings in
light of these findings.
3.

Sufficiency of the Pleadings

Here, Plaintiffs allege in pertinent part:
Defendant intentionally intercepted electronic
communications sent or received on wireless
internet connections (“WiFi connections”) by the
Class from at least May 25, 2007 through the
present … . (CCAC ¶ 1.) Defendant intercepted
the Class members’ electronic communications with
its Google Street View vehicles. (Id. ¶ 2.) When
Defendant’s engineers created the data collection
system for its Google Street View vehicles, most
commonly known as a packet analyzer or wireless
10

In the Matter of the Application of the United States for an
Order Authorizing the Roving Interception of Oral
Communications, 349 F.3d at 1138, n.12.
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sniffer, they intentionally included computer code
in the system that was designed to and did sample,
collect, decode, and analyze all types of data sent
and received over the WiFi connections of class
members. (Id. ¶ 4.)
This data included Class members’ unique,
secret WiFi network identifiers (known as Service
Set Identifier or SSID) and unique WiFi router
numbers (Media Access Control or MAC
addresses). (CCAC ¶ 4.) The data also included all
or part of any personal emails, passwords, videos,
audio, documents, and Voice Over Internet
Protocol (“VOIP”) information (collectively,
“payload data”) transmitted over Class members’
WiFi networks in which plaintiffs had a reasonable
expectation of privacy. (Id.) The WiFi networks
from which the Google Street View vehicles
collected payload data were not configured so that
such data were reasonably accessible by the
general public. (Id. ¶ 5.) Indeed, the data, as
captured by the wireless sniffer, are not even
readable by members of the public absent use of
sophisticated decoding and processing technology.
(Id.)
Based on the allegations above, the Court finds
that Plaintiffs plead facts sufficient to state a claim for
violation of the Wiretap Act. In particular, Plaintiffs
plead that Defendant intentionally created, approved
of, and installed specially-designed software and
technology into its Google Street View vehicles and
used this technology to intercept Plaintiffs’ data
packets, arguably electronic communications, from
Plaintiffs’ personal Wi-Fi networks. Further, Plaintiffs
plead that the data packets were transmitted over WiFi networks that were configured such that the packets
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were not readable by the general public without the use
of sophisticated packet sniffer technology. Although
Plaintiffs fail to plead that the wireless networks fall
into at least one of the five enumerated exceptions to
Section 2510(16)’s definition of “readily accessible to the
general public” for radio communications, the Court
finds that the wireless networks were not readily
accessible to the general public as defined by the
particular communication system at issue, wireless
internet
networks,
which
are
not
“radio
communications,” as the term was intended by
Congress in drafting Section 2510(16).
Rather, application of the Section 2510(16)
definition of “readily accessible to the general public”
as narrowly defined for traditional radio broadcast
technology, would be inapplicable to the determination
of whether Plaintiffs’ allegedly intercepted data
packets from their Wi-Fi networks are readily
accessible to the general public for purposes of
exemption G1, despite the fact that wireless networks
transmit data using radio waves. As the Court has
found, Congress intended Section 2510(16)’s definition
to resolve the issue of radio scanning devices used to
intercept radio broadcasts by establishing a
presumption that traditional radio services were
“readily accessible to the general public,” in accord with
the design of the medium as one where most
communications over that medium are intended to be
public. Unlike in the traditional radio services context,
communications sent via Wi-Fi technology, as pleaded
by Plaintiffs, are not designed or intended to be public.
Rather, as alleged, Wi-Fi technology shares a common
design with cellular phone technology, in that they both
use radio waves to transmit communications, however
they are both designed to send communications
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privately, as in solely to select recipients, and both
types of technology are architected in order to make
intentional monitoring by third parties difficult. S.
Rep. No. 99-541, at 6 (1986).
Further, applying Section 2510(16)’s narrow
definition of “readily accessible to the general public” to
wireless networks, a technology unknown to the 99th
Congress who drafted and passed the ECPA, would
contravene the primary stated purpose of the
amendment, which was to update the Wiretap Act to
include within the Act specific protections against
intentional interceptions of computer-to-computer
communications and so-called “electronic mail” or
email; data Plaintiffs plead was included in the data
packets intercepted by Defendant. Interpreting the
ECPA such that the statute provides obscure
limitations on the protection of emails and other
computer-to-computer communications based on the
particular medium that transmitted the electronic
communication would render the Wiretap Act, and the
efforts of the 99th Congress to provide such
protections, absurd. Under such an interpretation, the
Act would provide a private civil right of action, and
even impose criminal liability, for the interception of
emails transmitted over an ethernet cable through a
wired network, but would stop short at protecting
those very same emails should they pass momentarily
over radio waves through a Wi-Fi network established
to transmit data within a home. Such an interpretation
cannot pass muster in the face of an explicit limitation
that Section 2510(16)’s specialized definition of “readily
accessible to the general public” solely apply to “radio
communications,” a term undefined within the
statutory text, and where the legislative history of the
Act makes plain that Congress intended “radio
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communications” to mean traditional radio services or
broadcast radio.
Defendant’s contention that Plaintiffs fail to state a
claim for violation of the Wiretap Act, as Plaintiffs
plead that their networks were “open” and
“unencrypted,” is misplaced. (Motion at 8-11.) While
Plaintiffs plead that their networks, or electronic
communications systems, were configured such that the
general public may join the network and readily
transmit electronic communications across that
network to the Internet, Plaintiffs plead that the
networks were themselves configured to render the
data packets, or electronic communications, unreadable
and inaccessible without the use of rare packet sniffing
software; technology allegedly outside the purview of
the general public. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs
plead facts sufficient to support a claim that the Wi-Fi
networks were not “readily accessible to the general
public,” such that exemption G1 would not apply.
Defendant’s interpretation of United States v.
Ahrndt11 as standing for the principle that all
unencrypted wireless networks are readily accessible
to the general public and, thus, any interceptions from
those networks are obviated from liability under
exemption G1, unduly extends the doctrine. (Motion at
10-11.) In Ahrndt, a neighbor was connected to the
Internet via her own wireless network when her
network malfunctioned and her computer automatically
logged in to another open wireless network operated by
the defendant.
Id. at *1.
The defendant had
administered his iTunes software as set to “share,”
such that other users on the same network would be
able to access all files that the defendant had stored in
11

No. 08-468, 2010 WL 373994 (D. Or. Jan. 28, 2010).

95a
his iTunes libaries. Id. After being automatically
logged into the defendant’s wireless network, the
plaintiff in Ahrndt began using her own iTunes
program and noticed that the defendant’s iTunes
library was accessible. Id. In accessing the defendant’s
iTunes library, the plaintiff located a number of files
containing child pornography in a subfolder within the
shared directory. Id. Based on these facts, Judge King
held that the plaintiff’s interception was not illegal and
was, in fact, “expressly lawful” under the Wiretap Act
as the defendant’s network and iTunes software were
configured to be readily accessible to the general
public. Id. at *8. However, the court did not base its
holding merely on the fact the defendant’s network was
unencrypted. Id. Rather, Judge King found that
“defendant’s conduct in operating his iTunes software
with the preferences set to share, in conjunction with
maintaining an unsecured wireless network router,
diminished his reasonable expectation of privacy to the
point that society would not recognize it as reasonable.”
Id. at *8. Unlike in Ahrndt, here, Plaintiffs plead that,
although the networks themselves were unencrypted,
the networks were configured to prevent the general
public from gaining access to the data packets without
the assistance of sophisticated technology. (CCAC ¶ 5.)
Thus, the Court finds that, without more, merely
pleading that a network is unencrypted does not render
that network readily accessible to the general public
and serve to remove the intentional interception of
electronic communications from that network from
liability under the ECPA.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Cause of Action for
violation of the Federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511,
et seq.
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B. State Wiretap Statutes
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Third Cause
of Action for violation of various state wiretap statutes
on the grounds that claims under state wiretap statutes
are preempted by the Federal Wiretap Act on express,
field and conflict preemption grounds. (Motion at 1216.)
“Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution, federal law can preempt and
displace state law through: (1) express preemption; (2)
field preemption (sometimes referred to as complete
preemption); and (3) conflict preemption.” Ting v.
AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations
omitted). “Express preemption exists where Congress
enacts an explicit statutory command that state law be
displaced.” Id. (citations omitted). “Absent explicit
preemptive text, we may still infer preemption based
on field or conflict preemption … .” Id. A court may
find that federal law displaces state law on field
preemption grounds “when the federal statutory
scheme is sufficiently comprehensive to infer that
Congress left no room for supplementary regulation by
the states.” Public Utility Dist. No. 1 of Grays Harbor
Cty. Washington v. Idacorp, Inc., 379 F.3d 641, 647 (9th
Cir. 2004) (citations and quotations omitted). “When
the federal government completely occupies a given
field or an identifiable portion of it … , the test of
preemption is whether ‘the matter on which the state
asserts the right to act is in any way regulated by the
federal government.’” Id. (citations and quotations
omitted). However, “[i]n all cases, congressional intent
to preempt state law must be clear and manifest.” In
re Cybernetic Services, Inc., 252 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th
Cir. 2001).
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Here, the Court finds that, while the ECPA
contains no express preemptive statement on the part
of Congress,12 the ECPA was intended to
comprehensively regulate the interception of electronic
communications such that the scheme leaves no room in
which the states may further regulate. See Bunnell v.
Motion Picture Ass’n of America, 567 F. Supp. 2d 1148,
1154-55 (C.D. Cal. 2007). In particular, the ECPA was
enacted, in part, to provide legal certainty to users and
developers of innovative communications technologies
with bright line rules for liability. S. Rep. 99-541 at 4.
In so regulating, Congress struck a balance between
the right to the privacy of one’s electronic
communications against the ability of users to access
communications technologies without fear of liability
for inadvertent interception. S. Rep. 99-541 at 5-6.
State regulation acting in addition to the ECPA might
serve to obscure the legislative scheme surrounding
innovative communications technologies that Congress
intended to clarify through the Act, or could serve to
upset the fragile balance considered by Congress
between those who transmit electronic communications
and those who may inadvertently intercept those
communications. Further, the statute provides for
12

The Court finds that Defendant’s interpretation of Section
2518(10)(c) as an express preemption clause misinterprets the
provision. (Motion at 13.) The legislative history supports the
proposition that the provision was appended to the ECPA solely to
address suppression of evidence by criminal defendants. In re
NSA Telecomms. Records Order Litigation, 483 F. Supp. 2d 934,
939 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (Walker, J.) (holding that Section 2518(10)(c)
was drafted with the limited intent to prevent “criminal
defendants from suppressing evidence based on electronic
communications or customer records obtained in violation of
ECPA’s provisions”). Accordingly, the Court declines to adopt
Defendant’s position.
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criminal penalties, as well as a civil right of action for
violation of its provisions, such that the statute
provides broad protections for interceptions under the
Act. Thus, the Court finds that the federal Wiretap
Act preempts state wiretap statutory schemes.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Third Cause of Action for
violation of various state wiretap statutes with
prejudice.
C. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Second
Cause of Action for violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
§§ 17200, et seq., on the grounds that claim is
preempted by the Federal Wiretap Act on express,
field and conflict preemption grounds; and (2) assuming
arguendo that the claim is not preempted, Plaintiffs fail
to state a claim and fail to plead Proposition 64
standing. (Motion at 17-19.) The Court addresses each
ground in turn.
1.

Preemption

At issue is whether Plaintiffs’ claims for violation of
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq., is preempted
by the federal Wiretap Act.
Here, unlike in the context of the state wiretap
statutes, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq., does
not seek to regulate the same field as the federal
Wiretap Act. Rather, the statute was intended to
broadly enable “tribunals to enjoin wrongful business
conduct in whatever context such activity might occur.”
Barquis v. Merchants Collection Ass’n., 7 Cal. 3d 94,
111 (Cal. 1972). To this end, Section 17200’s prohibition
of “unlawful” acts does not proscribe specified conduct;

99a
rather, the statute incorporates violations of other
substantive law as the basis for imposing liability in
order to address the added harm to the marketplace of
undertaking such violations in a business context. CalTech Comm’ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 20
Cal. 4th 163, 180 (Cal. 1999). Further, the Federal
Wiretap Act provides no additional protection or
particular civil right of action for interceptions that
result in anticompetitive conduct or harm to the
market, nor do such additional protections conflict with
the stated purpose of the ECPA.
Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Second Cause
of Action for violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
§§ 17200, et seq., is not preempted by the federal
Wiretap Act.
2.

Proposition 64 Standing

At issue is whether Plaintiffs have properly
pleaded Proposition 64 standing sufficient to support
their Second Cause of Action for violations of Cal. Bus.
& Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.
To have standing to state a claim for violation of
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq., as amended by
the 2004 passage of Proposition 64, a plaintiff must
establish that he has suffered an “injury in fact” and
has “lost money or property as a result of such unfair
competition.” Hall v. Time Inc., 158 Cal. App. 4th 847,
852 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). Further, allegations of an
invasion of privacy are insufficient to invoke
Proposition 64 standing. Ruiz v. Gap, 540 F. Supp. 2d
1121, 1127 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
Here, Plaintiffs allege in pertinent part:
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Plaintiffs and National Class members have
suffered injury in fact and lost property as a result
of the unfair and unlawful business practices.
(CCAC ¶ 138.)
Based on the allegations above, the Court finds
that Plaintiffs fail to plead facts sufficient to support
Proposition 64 standing. In particular, interception of
data packets that a plaintiff has sent over a wireless
network are not lost property for purposes of
determining Proposition 64 standing.
Such an
indefinite claim of lost property would circumvent the
intent of voters, when passing the amendment, to
increase the pleading requirements to state a claim for
Section 17200 violation. Further, Plaintiffs contentions
that merely incurring attorney fees and expenses as a
result of bringing a Section 17200 claim are equally
inapposite,13 and would effectively eviscerate the
heightened standing requirements of Proposition 64.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Cause of Action
for violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.,
without prejudice to Plaintiffs to amend their pleadings
to add facts sufficient to support Proposition 64
standing, if so desired.14

13
14

(Opp’n at 25.)

In amending its UCL claim, Plaintiffs must also allege more
than a loss of personal information. A plaintiff’s “personal
information” does not constitute property under the UCL.
Thompson v. Home Depot, Inc., No. 07cv1058 IEG, 2007 WL
2746603, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2007).
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V. CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as follows:
(1) The Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion as to
Plaintiffs’ First Cause of Action for violation of
the Federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, et
seq.;
(2) The Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Third Cause of Action for
violation of various state wiretap statutes with
prejudice; and
(3) The Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Cause of Action for
violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et
seq., with leave to amend.
On or before August 1, 2011, Plaintiffs shall file an
Amended Complaint consistent with the terms of this
Order.
Dated: June 29, 2011

/s/ James Ware
JAMES WARE
United States District Chief Judge

103a
APPENDIX D
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
18 U.S.C. § 2510. Definitions
*

*

*

(16) “readily accessible to the general public”
means, with respect to a radio communication, that
such communication is not—
(A) scrambled or encrypted;
(B) transmitted using modulation techniques
whose essential parameters have been withheld
from the public with the intention of preserving the
privacy of such communication;
(C) carried on a subcarrier or other signal
subsidiary to a radio transmission;
(D) transmitted over a communication system
provided by a common carrier, unless the
communication is a tone only paging system
communication; or
(E) transmitted on frequencies allocated under
part 25, subpart D, E, or F of part 74, or part 94 of
the Rules of the Federal Communications
Commission, unless, in the case of a communication
transmitted on a frequency allocated under part 74
that is not exclusively allocated to broadcast
auxiliary services, the communication is a two-way
voice communication by radio;
*

*

*
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18 U.S.C. §2511. Interception and disclosure of
wire, oral, or electronic communications prohibited
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this
chapter any person who—
(a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to
intercept, or procures any other person to intercept
or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or
electronic communication;
*

*

*

[(2)](g) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter
or chapter 121 of this title for any person—
(i) to intercept or access an electronic
communication made through an electronic
communication system that is configured so that
such electronic communication is readily accessible
to the general public;
(ii) to intercept any radio communication which
is transmitted—
(I) by any station for the use of the general
public, or that relates to ships, aircraft,
vehicles, or persons in distress;
(II) by any governmental, law enforcement,
civil defense, private land mobile, or public
safety communications system, including police
and fire, readily accessible to the general
public;
(III) by a station operating on an
authorized frequency within the bands
allocated to the amateur, citizens band, or
general mobile radio services; or
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(IV) by any marine
communications system;

or

aeronautical

(iii) to engage in any conduct which—
(I) is prohibited by section 633 of the
Communications Act of 1934; or
(II) is excepted from the application of
section 705(a) of the Communications Act of
1934 by section 705(b) of that Act;
(iv) to intercept any wire or electronic
communication the transmission of which is causing
harmful interference to any lawfully operating
station or consumer electronic equipment, to the
extent necessary to identify the source of such
interference; or
(v) for other users of the same frequency to
intercept any radio communication made through a
system that utilizes frequencies monitored by
individuals engaged in the provision or the use of
such system, if such communication is not
scrambled or encrypted.
*

*

*

